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CHAPTER 1.  
INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW  
One of the most interesting developments in trade  
policy in recent years has been the emergence of the  
environment as an issue in trade liberalization. With the  
increased awareness of the environment, it is becoming clear  
that the environment and international trade are linked. In  
consequence, it is necessary to consider environmental  
effects when we analyze trade policies. This interaction  
between the environment and trade policies might affect  
trade patterns and investment.  
The linkage between the environment and trade policies  
has been of great concern for economists and policy-makers.  
The recent trading blocks such as APEC (Asia-Pacific  
Economic Cooporation) and NAFTA (North American Free Trade  
Agreement) have been including environmental issues in trade  
policy on the grounds that they might affect the production  
of environmental goods through further market liberalization  
policies.  
It might be possible for some countries to use  
environmental policies as an alternative trade policy to  
preserve their own environment. The growing trend of  2 
environment preservation can be seen from the fact that  
international trade barriers have been reduced substantially  
whereas environmental regulations have increased.  
In the literature, there have been growing concerns  
about the economic effects of environmental policy changes.  
A recent work by Copeland (1994) examines sufficient  
conditions for welfare-improving policy reforms in a small  
open economy facing trade and pollution distortions. He  
shows that the welfare benefits of reforming pollution  
policy are greater in an economy with a higher degree of  
factor market liberalization than in an economy with a lower  
degree of factor market liberalization. Copeland (1994)  
observes that the influence of direct environmental policy  
change is greater in a developed economy than in a  
developing economy if it is assumed that the developed  
country has a higher degree of liberalization in both input  
and output markets. Another interesting paper about the  
environment by Chichilnisky (1994) tackles the environmental  
issue from a different prospective. Chichilnisky addresses  
how differences in property rights influence international  
trade among two regions. She finds that differences in  
property rights generate a motive for trade among otherwise  
identical regions. This result may provide some answers into  
why developing countries (ill-defined property rights)  tend  
to specialize in the production of the environmental good.  
It is interesting to see that developing countries often  3 
have a comparative advantage in the production of  
environmental goods over developed countries.  
The above two papers suggest that government regulations may  
affect environmental development because regulations on the  
environment protect against the deterioration of natural  
habitat. Numerous papers about environmental effects have  
been presented in the literature  (e.g., Hecht, 1985; Amelung,  
1991; Barbier, Burgess and Markandya, 1991; Hyde and Newman,  
1991).  
It is however well known that developing countries  
have been using government regulations to attract more  
foreign investment. Specifically, differences in the  
environmental regulations among otherwise identical  
countries create incentives for a country with stricter  
environmental regulations to invest in a country with less  
strict environmental regulations. Thus, it is usually true  
that higher environmental regulation increases the  
investment cost of the affected country. This investment  
cost differential between otherwise identical countries  
influences the direction of investment as well as trade.  
Generally, it is more likely that a developed country will  
have stricter environmental regulations than a developing  
country. Foreign capital inflow is also induced by  
differences between investment tax rates and returns to  
investments. In my dissertation,  I assume that investment  
incentives come from the differences in tax rates and  
investment returns between two countries. A number of  4 
articles have analyzed the theoretical aspects of foreign  
investment in a static model  (e.g.,  Dei, 1979; Das, 1981;  
Rivera-Batiz and Rivera-Batiz, 1991). The static analysis of  
foreign investment treats capital as a stock rather than a  
flow. This static analysis does not provide for  
international investment flow over time. Because of the  
limited ability of static models, Young and Romero (1990)  
consider a two-period model where international investment  
is viewed as financial flows. This two-period model is  
limited however because it is not a full dynamic analysis.  
Thus, in the third chapter of this dissertation, foreign  
investment effect will be included in a full dynamic model.  
Although the inflow of foreign capital in a host  
country might satisfy the desire of liberalization policy  
such as higher employment, it is also possible that the  
government policy might damage the environment. This  
situation is described in a study of locational theory with  
unemployment. Jones and O'Neil (1995) found that an increase  
in urban infrastructure may relieve or exacberate  
deforestation. This phenomenon suggests that policy affects  
not only employment but also the size of the forest area.  
Following Jones and O'Neil,  I also use the Harris-Todaro  
unemployment model (1970). Unlike Jones and O'Neil, in my  
dissertation I include foreign direct investment in a  
dynamic setting. The Harris-Todaro model assumes sector- 
specific wage rigidity and allows unemployment only in the  
urban sector.  5 
With the inclusion of foreign investment and an  
environmental good, my research takes up a  general  
aggregrative framework to study how changes in the  
environment induced by the change in foreign investment  
policy influence human behavior. In the presence of  
unemployment,  I develop a general equilibrium model of an  
economy with three sectors: an  agriculture sector, a  
manufacturing sector and an environmental sector. In the  
context of locational allocation, the model  is composed of  
three areas:  an urban area, a rural area and a forest area.  
The analysis in my paper combines general trade theory  
with locational theory. In a study of general trade theory  
with unemployment, Beladi and Chao (1993) and Das (1981)  
examine how a disturbance in one sector affects economic  
activity variables such as unemployment, welfare and other  
variables. However, these two papers only use a static  
analysis.  
In my research,  I combine the Harris-Todaro model with  
a locational model which includes dynamic foreign  
investment. The following is a brief description of my  
dissertation.  
Chapter 2 focuses on the static model which only  
concerns a one-shot policy change. This analysis considers  
the environmental effect on the domestic country as  the  
capital market is further liberalized by a  lowering of the  
foreign capital investment tax rate. In regard to investment  
tax policy, Janeba (1995) has used three different tax  6 
rules. They are credit-cum-limitation  (CCL), exemption(EX),  
and deduction rules(DED). Under the CCL rule, a foreign  
country receives credit for the amount of  foreign taxes paid  
if the amount of domestic taxes paid is larger than that of  
foreign taxes paid. In the EX rule, a host country offers a  
complete exemption from the domestic taxation for foreign  
capital investment. In the DED rule, a host country allows  
the foreign tax to be deducted from the amount of foreign  
capital investment. My research in chapter 2 focuses on the  
CCL method as the domestic policy choice. However,  I chose  
CCL because it is the most flexible of the three tax rules.  
The other two tax rules could be analyzed using the same  
method.  
Chapter 3 uses a dynamic general equilibrium model  
where the two-sector model is composed of a domestic  
production sector and foreign production sector in the home  
country. In this model the foreign sector produces an  
importable good (a manufactured good), whereas the  domestic  
sector produces an exportable good (agricultural  good).  
will use this model to examine the following different  
dynamic capital liberalization policies: unanticipated  
permanent, anticipated permanent, anticipated temporary, and  
anticipated gradual liberalization. These policies will be  
examined to identify the environmental effect. Other dynamic  
economic models that incorporate investment  in physical  
capital input with respect to permanent and  temporary policy  
include those by Abel (1982), Sen and Turnovsky  (1990),  
I 7 
Roldos (1991), Fisher and Turnovsky (1992). The above papers  
are, however, based on unanticipated policy analysis instead  
of anticipated policy analysis.  
The unique feature of this paper is that the domestic  
agent holds land as the only asset whereas the foreign agent  
holds capital as the only asset in investment. This is  
typical of developing countries where investment in land is  
very high. The importance of land as an asset  shows up in  
the following survey results: In South-Korea, a survey  
conducted in 1995 by the Korean Economic Review reported  
that one in every two South-Koreans faced with a windfall in  
income would spend the income on purchasing land as a  
personal asset. In Singapore, a survey conducted by the  
Marketing Service and Research Division of Singapore Press  
Holdings in October 1995, polled 565 persons aged 15 and  
above, found that 91 percent of those 565 persons chose land  
(property) as the most important asset to own.  
In chapter 4  an environmental good is included in the  
utility function. This inclusion of an environmental good  
provides insight into how environmental effects influence  
economic performance. In a developing country, the inclusion  
of an environmental good in the consumer's utility does  
reduce the development of land. However, in a developed  
country where the environmental effect is very strong,  the  
inclusion of an environmental good in the consumer's utility  
might cause reforestation instead of deforestation. In  this  8 
chapter, the complete analysis of the  environmental effect  
will be investigated.  
The last chapter summarizes a conclusion of this  
paper. Bibliography and Appendix follow the conclusion of  
Chapter 5.  9 
CHAPTER 2.  
A STATIC ANALYSIS OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS  
OF A CAPITAL INVESTMENT TAX POLICY  
2.1 INTRODUCTION  
The environment has become more and more important as  
the rate of industrialization has increased. This increased  
economic activity is reflected in the importance of land as  
a key and finite resource for most human activities  
including agriculture, industry, forestry, energy  
production, settlement, and recreation. As a result, land  
development imposes significant restrictions on human  
activities through environmental change. On the other hand,  
human activities such as liberalization policies also change  
land development. Thus, the complex interaction between the  
environment and human activities provides a difficult task  
for policy-makers. In this chapter,  I show how capital  
market liberalization policy interracts with the  
environmental variable and economic variables such as  
unemployment and welfare in a general equilibrium framework  
with distortions. The distortions are the use of a foreign  
capital investment tax and a minimum wage system in the  
urban labor market.  
In the presence of wage rigidity and capital trade  
barriers in the host country, there is both unemployment and  10 
capital investment opportunity. The domestic firm in the  
urban sector produces and sells the tradeable good for the  
market of the host and a foreign country. On the other hand,  
the agricultural industry in the rural sector produces and  
sells a non-tradeable good in the host country only. The  
reason for foreign direct investment (FDI) in the home  
country is that the return to capital investment in the host  
country is greater than the return to capital investment in  
the foreign country. The different capital investment  
returns are due to the different investment tax rates and  
profits between the two countries.  
The developing country has a desire to induce more  
foreign investment since the country has only a small amount  
of its own physical capital due to the lack of financial  
capital or technology. To stimulate more foreign investment  
in the home country, many countries provide foreign  
investors with special tax policies or other incentives. In  
this paper,  I only consider capital investment tax policy.  
Liberalizing the capital market by lowering the investment  
tax rate will induce more foreign investment because the  
return to capital investment in the host country increases.  
This foreign capital inflow will continue to equalize the  
return to capital between two countries.  
The host developing government may increase foreign  
investment by lowering the investment tax rate. However, it  
is unlikely that the foreign capital inflow will not affect  
unemployment and the environment. It might be possible for  11 
the welfare of a country to improve with further  
liberalization of the capital market if the host country  
does not place much value on the environment. On the other  
hand, this result may be reversed if the consumers do value  
the environment. To investigate further,  I use a static  
analysis.  
The organization of this chapter is as follows.  
Section II presents the basic model and capital tax rules  
and section III investigates the effects of further capital  
market liberalization on the environment, unemployment,  
welfare.  12 
2.2 THE BASIC MODEL  
2.2.1 Production  Side Economy 
To focus on the environmental problems caused by a  
policy change in the presence of unemployment,  I employ the  
Harris-Todaro (1970) rural-urban-migration mechanism. This  
model explains the existence of unemployment in an urban  
area.  
I allow for three different types of land use in my  
model. They are:  (1) manufacturing, which is produced in the  
urban sector,  (2) agriculture, which is conducted in the  
rural sector, and (3) environmental goods (such as fresh air  
and natural surroundings), which are produced in the forest  
sector. Here,  I assume that natural production mechanisms  
such as photosynthesis produce the environmental goods in  
the forest area. In this way,  I can simplify the analysis of  
the environmental effects of a policy change.  
This paper builds upon the Harris-Todaro model by  
introducing an environmental factor (e.g.,  land in the  
agricultural sector). It is assumed that each country  
produces the same goods and that all production functions  
are concave. Additionally all factors are used in some  
positive amount in the production process. The model  
presented here is a general equilibrium model of three  
sectors: an agricultural goods producing-nontradeable  
sector, a manufacturing goods producing-tradeable  sector and  
an environmental good producing-forest  sector. In the  13 
nontradeable sector a single homogeneous good X is  
produced, using labor nx and a sector specific input,  land  
Lx. The technology of this sector is a concave production  
technology:  
X = X(n., Lx) 
where X satisfies the usual properties of a neoclasssical 
production function with X, > 0, X2i <0 and X2i > 0 for all i7j; 
i,j==nx  and Lx. In the tradeable goods sector labor is 
combined with a sector specific input, capital to produce a 
manufacturing good Y under concave production technology: 
Y'..rny,  
where Y satisfies the usual neoclassical properties. In the  
forest sector, the environmental good Q is produced by  
nature:  
Q = Lf  
where the production function of Q is assumed to use only  
the forest land Lf. To simplify the analysis, I assume that  
the function itself is the identity function.  
Given input prices, the representative firm chooses  
input quantities to maximize profits since the  
representative firm considers itself to be too small to  
influence the market prices.  
The factor demand equations are  
FWOlx, L) = w  
PXLx(nr, L) =3  
Yn,(ny, K) = 
YOOV) = r 14 
where the price of Y is normalized to 1, w is the wage rate  
of workers  in the X sector,  is the wage rate in the Y  17.)  
sector and r is the rental rate on capital  service. I assume  
that the fixed wage rate ID is set by the government and is  
above the rate that clears the market. This assumption of a  
fixed wage in the manufacturing sector is the main source of  
unemployment in the urban sector.  
I also assume that the marginal productivity of land  
in the production of good X is equal to the per-unit fixed  
cost j of converting forest land to agricultural land and  
that reconverting agriculture land to forest land is free.  
The assumption that there is zero cost of  reconverting from  
forest agriculture land to forest land does not  
significantly affect the result of this paper.  
Another important observation is that even though the  
relative market price of good X (P) is endogenously  
determined in the market, P is exogenous to the  
representative firm since we assume that the representative  
firm is too small to affect the market price.  
Following the Harris-Todaro model (1970), labor  
migrates between the low wage sector X and the high wage  
sector Y. This equalizes the expected wage in the two  
sectors so that  
w= w(1-+-µ)  
where p=nidny is the ratio of unemployed to employed  
workers in the urban sector. This migration equilibrium  
equation indicates that the expected wage in the  urban  15 
sector is equal to the wage rate in the rural sector. The  
assumption that land is only employed in the agriculture  
sector may be considered objectionable on the grounds that  
such an assumption is inappropriate for a model  that seeks  
to explain factor intensity effects or is inappropriate  
the  because manufacturing industries use land. However,  
addition of the land input in the manufacturing sector does  
not significantly change the result of this model.  
Furthermore, the emphasis of this analysis is on impacts to  
rural and forest areas.  
The equilibrium conditions  in the factor markets are  
given by  
nr  ny (1 -F p) ==  
Lx+ Lf =.7;  
KH + z = K  
where N is the fixed number of total labor force,  Z is the  
foreign capital inflow,  K1/ is the fixed domestic capital  
stock and  Lx  is the agricultural land stock. The assumption 
of fixed domestic capital stock is appropriate because  
developing economies face a shortage of their own capital  
stock due to a lack of technology. Thus, they tend to import  
capital stock from foreign countries. In the model developed  
in this paper foreign capital inflow has a direct effect on  
production in the manufacturing  sector and an indirect  
effect on production in the agriculture sector.  16 
2.2.2 Capital Tax System  
With the model in place, it is time now to introduce a  
capital investment tax structure in the host country.  
Following  Janeba (1995), three different types of capital  
investment tax systems will be explained.  However, only one  
of three systems in this chapter will be utilized to study  
the domestic environmental effects of domestic investment  
tax policy changes. It is assumed that each country has its  
own non-discriminatory investment tax ranges: iE [0, i,] and  
i*E[0,4,.] where the superscript * denotes the foreign  
I assume that the maximum investment  country. Additionally,  
tax rate in each country is less than one.  Each country uses  
one of the following three taxation rules:  
Rule 1. A foreign firm can receive credit for the amount of  
foreign taxes paid as long as this amount does not  
exceed the amount which would have been  incurred under  
pure domestic taxation.  This is called the CCL  
(credit-cum-limitation) method.  
Rule 2. The host country provides a complete  exemption from  
domestic taxation for foreign capital investment in the  
domestic economy. As a result, only foreign capital  
taxation is relevant for capital investment  in the  
domestic economy. This is called the EX (exemption)  
method.  
Rule 3. A host country allows the foreign tax to be deducted  
from the amount of dollars spent on a foreign direct  
investment prior to the calculation of domestic  17 
taxation. This is called the deduction  (DED)  method. 
The foreign capital owner in the home country faces the tax 
factor {1 max(i, i*)} on a direct investment in the home 
country under CCL, (1i*) under EX and (1 i)(1 i*) under 
DED. As a result, the capital market equilibrium conditions 
are  
CCL :  r(1  max(i, i*))  = r*(1  i*)  (1) 
EX:  r  (1  i*)  = r* (1  i*)  (2) 
DED :  r(1  (1  i*) = r*(1  (3) i*) .  
Notice that CCL and EX are equal when r is greater than i.  
This completes the specification of the domestic production- 
side equilibrium conditions. However, this chapter only  
analyzes the CCL in the case when i is greater than i* since  
the other cases can be analyzed in the same method.  
2 .2 . 3  Consumption  Side Economy 
A representative consumer who does not take  
environmental goods into account in his utility function,  
minimizes his expenditures on Cx and Cy given the price of  
Cx is P and Cy is 1,  and subject to the constraint that his  
utility can not be reduced. Formally,  
E(P, 1HY) =,mtin (PCx + Cy)  subject  to (Inc, Cy) > irJ  . 
However, this traditional expenditure function is not 
appropriate because it does not capture the environmental 
effect. The following revised expenditure function includes 
environmental goods in the utility function: 
E(P, 1, Q, U) = min (PCx + Cy) subject to (I ry, Cy,  .  18 
where Q is exogenous since the amount of environmental 
goods available is supplied by nature. The partial 
derivative of E(.) with respect to price, denoted by Ep, 
yields the consumption level of good X. The partial 
derivative of E(.)  with respect to the  environmental good 
Q, denoted by EQ, yields the shadow value of environmental 
good. This specification completes the consumer-side 
equilibrium conditions. With the model for this small 
country economy completely specified, the host country's 
equilibrium conditions are following: 
Budget constraint :  Consumption spending = Revenue 
E(1, P, Q, U) = PX(nr, Lx) + Y(ny, K)  T  (4) 
Agriculture market equilibrium : Demand = Supply 
Ep(1, P, U) = X(nx, Lx)  (5) 
Environmental good equilibrium : 
Q  Lf  (6)  
Input market equilibrium : 
PXnz(nx, Lx) = w  (7) 
PXLz(nx, Lx) = b  (8) 
Yn,(ny,  (9)  
YK(ny, K) = r  (10) 
nx  nt,(1  ti) =N  (11) 
Lx+Lf =L  (12) 
KH +Z =K  (13)  
Labor migration equilibrium : 
tTi  w(l+p)  (14)  19 
International capital equilibrium under different tax rules : 
Equations (1),  (2)  and  (3). 
where T in equation (4)  is the amount of payment to the  
foreign country for foreign capital service (the exact level  
of T depends on which tax rule is chosen). The good Y  
market equilibrium condition is not included in the general  
equilibrium conditions because it is implied by Walras' law.  20 
2.3 THE ENVIRONMENTAL, UNEMPLOYMENT and WELFARE EFFECTS OF  
INVESTMENT TAX POLICY CHANGE UNDER CREDIT-CUM-LIMITATION TAX  
SYSTEM  
2.3.1 The Short  Run Equilibrium Analysisl 
I am now in a position to examine the endogeneous 
effect of a further liberalization of the capital market 
under CCL. The relevant equations for this analysis are (1) 
and (4)-(14). Instead of solving the entire 12 x 12 matrix, 
it will be useful to first solve for the effect of the 
policy change on domestic production. The relevant 
equilibrium conditions for the domestic production side 
general equilibrium are equations (7)-(14). This system of 
equations contains six endogeneous variables; n, ny,  L, Lf, 
r and p. However, this system of equations can be further 
reduced to a four-equations system by using Walras'law. The 
question is which four equations would be appropriate. The 
decision depends on the focus of the analysis. In this 
paper, equation (10)  is dropped for the moment. Note that  
equations (7) and (14) imply:  
PX.(nx, Lx)(1+  = 7.7;  (15) 
Therefore, the reduced appropriate domestic production 
equilibrium system is composed of equations (8),  (9),  (11) 
and (15). 
In order to simplify the solution procedure, P and K  
are treated as parameters in this first stage equilibrium,  
but later this assumption is relaxed for the whole market  
II use the terminology, short-run and temporary interchangeably in this paper 21 
analysis. To derive the short-run equilibrium effect where  
the price of agriculture and the amount of total capital are  
fixed, totally differentiate equations (8),  (9),  (11) and  
(15). The total differential is  
13XLirl.  0  P X LxLx  0  /  X.Lz 
0  Yno,  0  dny  dP
P(1 + 1.1)X%72  0  P(1 + P)Xnxi  PX,,x  dLx  Xn.(1+ A) 
(  1 1+A  0  nY dp  0  
+ (  Yrivic)dK.
0  
0  
Solving the system for equilibrium nx,ny,Lx,  and p with 
respect to P and K,  we obtain: 
n,Y,',,,,{P(1+A)Xn.L.XL.P(1+14)XL./,Xn.} dnxIdP 
IDI  > 0,  (16a) 
dnyldP = 0,  (16b) 
17,,s,,,v{n,(1+p)PXLz,,xX,,z+nt,(1+A)P2XnetzXL.n.XLPXn.XLz} dLxIdP =  (16c)
IDI  
Ynyy{P(1+  XrzzLzX LzP(1+14)XnxnxXnx}  0  =  (16d) IDI 
PYKxnx,x7,z(1 +p) dnx I dK =  < 0,  (16e)
IDI  
Yrt K  dny/ dK =  > 0,  (16f) 
Ynyny  
P2(1 +m)Y,,Kxz,,zxnz dLx dK =  (16g)
IDI 
(1+A)Yzic(P2(1 +A)x!L -P2(i+p)xL.L.xnzra.1 < 0 dK =  (16h)
f1 IDI 
IDI = PnyYn7,,,, { P(1 + ti,)[VisL,  X nz%X LzLx] + X 1,j,z} > 0.  
The only effect we consider in the short-run is the supply  
(production) side effect.  
In the short-run, an increase in the price of the 
agricultural product, P, lowers real wages in the rural 
sector and leads firms to hire more workers  (dnxIdP > 0).  At 22 
the same time, the rising price of the agricultural product  
lowers real land cultivating costs and leads firms to employ  
more land(dLxIdP > 0) .  The additional workers for the rural  
sector will come from the unemployed in the urban sector  
since the value of marginal labor productivity in the urban  
sector is not affected by the price change P. As a result,  
the unemployment ratio µ in the urban sector will decrease.  
I can thus conclude that in the short-run the rise in the  
price of the nontraded sector goods (agricultural products)  
would raise the short-run supply of agricultural goods and 
would have no effect at all on the tradeable sector. This is 
because there are initially enough unemployed persons in the 
urban sector to satisfy the increase in labor demand in the 
rural sector. Thus,  dX /dP > 0, dY /dP = 0,  and dA/dP < 0. 
By the same analysis, an increase in capital K, which  
is equivalent to an increase in foreign capital since  
domestic capital is fixed, must raise the demand for labor  
in the manufacturing sector because the wage rate is fixed  
(Tv). At the beginning of the movement towards short-run  
equilibrium, additional labor in the manufacturing industry  
will come from the urban unemployed sector. The reduced  
unemployment ratio (A)  in the urban sector will then  
stimulate workers in the rural sector to migrate to the  
urban sector for the higher wage rate w because there is an  
increase in job opportunity in the urban sector. This  
migration of labor to the urban sector causes a reduction in  
land demand in the agriculture industry since labor and land  23 
in the X sector are by assumption complements. Hence,  the  
inflow of foreign capital K in the home country will  
decrease the production of the nontraded good X and raise  
the production of traded good Y. On the unemployment side, 
the foreign capital increase will reduce the unemployment 
ratio in the urban sector. The results of the capital effect 
on the endogeneous variables can be expressed as axial(  < 0, 
DY/alf > 0, ap/aK < 0 and aL,Ialc < 0. If we assume that the 
production technology is constant returns to scale  (i.e.  
X  = nsf(r-ft), Y  = nyg(-71,-;))  then 
dnr/dP = (1+12)A.) > 0, 
dnyldP = 0,  
dLxIdP = 
nov(l+p)(Lz/n,r)-Pni:6(1+p)(L3In1)(1)2-(wC5n/P)  
(( 111 777 bca )))  > 0, 
Pnvf" 
=(1+,4){-111(11-17"(:)21  
0,  nyf 
1177 de ))  dnxIdK =  -w(1+:)()2  <0, 
(17 f)  dnyldK =1.k  > 0,  
dLx/dK =  -w(1+;)(&r)  <0,  (17g)  
dpIdK = 0,  (17h)  
The above results are consistent with those of the classical  
trade model since the unemployment rate p only depends on  
P.  
Throughout this dissertation I assume that the  
stability2 condition is satisfied at all times. The  
comparative static results discussed above are important for  
the long-run analysis in the subsquent section.  
21 assume a Walrasian adjustment in the nontradeable good market. 24 
2 .3 .2  The Long  Run Equilibrium Analysis 
The long-run equilibrium condition is defined as a  
state in which all endogeneous variables are in equilibrium  
unless there is an external shock. In this paper the  
investment tax change is the external shock. The appropriate  
equations for this analysis are equations (4)-(6) and (10).  
These four equations combined with the result of the short- 
run analysis can be used to study long-run effects. Before  
proceeding further,  I will discuss some special aspects of  
the demand side. The consumer's utility depends on the  
consumption of the traded, nontraded, and environmental  
goods. It is assumed that these tradeable and nontradeable  
goods are normal goods in consumption. The optimized  
expenditure function E(1,P,u) captures the demand side- 
economy by minimizing expenditure on consumption goods X,  
Y and Q, subject to a strictly quasi-concave utility  
function. As usual, the expenditure function,  E(.),  is  
increasing and strictly concave in price P from the  
properties of expenditure function. In equilibrium, the  
country's expenditure equals the revenue from production  
minus the net payments to foreign capital invested at home.  
Since the tax rule in this section is CCL, the budget  
constraint is  
E(1,P,Q,U)=PX(P,K)+Y(K)-r(1-i)Z  (18) 
where the net payment to foreign capital is --7-(1.-OZ . 
Equilibrium in the nontradeable-good market requires that 
demand equals supply for the nontraded good. That is 25 
Ep(l, P, Q, U) = X(P, K)  (19) 
In the capital market, the domestic rate of return to 
capital is equal to the value of  the marginal product of 
capital in all domestic use. That is 
YK(ny,K) = r  (20) 
If i is greater than r, then in equilibrium the CCL tax 
system requires 
r(1  = r*(1  )  (21) 
By the small country assumption, r* and e are exogenous. 
Equations (18)-(21) form a system of long-run equilibrium in 
P,Z and U. By taking total differentials of long-run 
equilibrium equations,  I have 
b12 Eu  rZ  0  
b21  b22  Ep  d Z  =  0  ) di + (  0 ) di*  
0  b32 0 dU  r  r*  
where  
b11 = PXp  Eci(dQIdP) > 0,  (22a)  
b12 = P Xz +Yz  EQ(dQIdZ)  r(1  i)  Z(1  (22b)  
b21 = Epp + EpQ(dQ dP)  Xp 0,  (22c)  
b22 = EpQ(dQ/dZ)  XzO,  (22d)  
b32 = (1  i)(YrucYno,  lin2,14/Ynyny < 0.  (22e)  
The solution of  the system gives  
r(b12Epu+622Eu+Zb32EPu)  > n dPIdi  (23)
1AI 
dZIdi =  r(b2lEu+bllEPu)  <  (24)
b32  '  
r(b11b22Zb21632b12621} >  dUIdi  lAt '  (25) < 26 
jAl=  b32{b21Eu +bllEpu} < 0, 
where lAidenotes the determinant of coefficients matrix. The 
same rules such as the local stability condition3 and 
cooperative factors are applied to determine the sign of 
economic effects of policy changes. 
2. 3. 3  The Relative Price E f fect 
In this section, assuming that the rate of return to  
the internationally mobile capital is taxed under the CCL  
rule of international capital taxation,  I establish  
sufficient conditions under which liberalization of the  
capital market, through the reduction of the tax on the  
domestic capital rate of return by the small capital  
importing country, leads to an increase or decrease of its  
relative price of the nontradeable good. This relative price  
of the nontradeable good can be interpreted as the real  
exchange rate between two countries.  
Now consider the relative price effect of a lower  
capital tax under a system of CCL. As shown in equation  
(23), the lower capital tax affects the relative price of  
the nontradable good. This result is made more clear by  
rewriting equation (23) as follows:  
-r{(EuXz-PEpuXz-EPuYz)+J+(EpuEq-EvEr4)4) 
( 2 6 )   dP /di = 
IAI  
3See pp 641 in Chiang (1984) for details.  27 
where J=r(1i)Epu. The sign of equation (26) depends on the  
sign of the numerator which is the net demand effect. The  
net demand effect consists of the supply (production), the  
environmental (demand-side) and the foreign capital tax  
revenue effect.  
The terms in the numerator show that the lower  
capital tax affects the relative price of the nontradeable  
good directly through the term in the first set of  
parenthesis in the numerator which is the production effect.  
This term shows that the sign of the net supply side effect  
depends on the sign of its direct output effect (Epuliz)  
and the cross-industry output effect (EuXzPEpuXz)   .  
However, one can find that the supply side effect has a  
negative sign since the indirect cross-industry output  
effect (EuXzEpuPXz) is negative by the homogeneous  
property of the expenditure function with respect to P.  
The next term J  ( =r(1i)Epu) in the numerator is the  
foreign capital tax revenue effect induced by the lower  
investment tax rate. The sign on the foreign capital tax  
revenue variable is positive since the sign of Epu is  
positive. However, The foreign capital tax revenue effect is  
likely to be small in a developing country where the economy  
has a higher initial tax rate (i:'21, thus (1-07.:_-0) .  
The last set of parentheses in the numerator [i.e.,  
(EpuEQ  EuEpci)ddli is the environmental effect. The sign on  
the environmental effect variable depends on the sign of  
EN. Because I assume that the agricultural good and the  28 
environmental good are complements in consumption, EPQ is  
positive. As a result, the net environmental effect is  
negative since the term N is positive (see equation (17g))  
and EQ( =  )is negative. Note that the term EQ is  
negative since an increase in the environmental good implies  
a reduction of agricultural land, thus decreasing the income  
from the land input resource.  
Thus, the sign of equation (26)  is ambiguous since the  
supply effect, the environmental effect and foreign capital  
tax revenue effect do not move in the same direction.  
However, the sign of equation (26)  is positive in a  
developing economy because the environmental effect is small  
and the supply effect is more likely to dominate the foreign  
capital revenue effect. Additionally, the sign of equation  
(26)  is positive in a developed economy because the positive  
environmental effect will dominate the negative foreign  
capital tax revenue effect since developed economies usually  
have strong environmental awareness. As a result, the net  
demand effect is negative which implies that the low foreign  
capital tax raises the price of the nontradeable good.  
In fact, the general intuition of the price effect is  
worth exploring in more depth. As the capital market becomes  
more liberalized, the increased foreign capital inflow into.  
the domestic market induces an increase in employment  
opportunities in sector Y. This result is due to the  
assumption of cooperative factors between labor and capital.  
This increase in employment opportunities in the urban  29 
sector then stimulates more migration to the urban sector.  
If the net total employment in both sectors is higher, the  
net demand for both goods increases since the lower  
unemployment in the economy generates an income effect  
through the higher production of tradeable goods. However,  
the loss of employment in the agriculture sector due to  
higher migration to the urban sector will lower the demand  
for land by agricultural industry owners and this will lead  
to less production of the nontradeable good which reduces  
the net income of the agricultural industry. The reduction  
of net income from the decrease in production in the  
agricultural sector generates an income effect which causes  
a lower demand for goods X and Y.  
The lower the land demand in the nontradeable sector,  
the greater the production of the environmental good by  
nature and the higher the consumption of the environmental  
good. The consequent increase in the consumption of the  
environmental good then causes the consumer to increase his  
consumption of the agricultural good if these two goods are  
complements in demand (EpQ> 0) .  Additionally, because the  
initial lower capital tax rate reduces the per-unit capital  
import tax revenue, there will be a lower demand for  
consumption in goods X and Y. This results from the income  
effect arising from the foreign capital tax revenue change  
since the two goods are assumed to be normal goods. Thus,  
the net price effect is determined by the relative size of  
the demand effect (from the income effect) and  the supply  30 
effect (from the input change) where it depends on the  
environmental effect, the foreign capital tax revenue  
effect and output effect.  
In general, if the demand effect of the nontradeable  
good dominates the supply effect of the nontradeable good,  
the relative price of the nontradeable good increases when  
the degree of capital market liberalization increases  
(dPIdi< 0  where a decrease in i is an increase in 
liberalization). As I already mentioned in the discussion, a 
capital market liberalization policy results in a higher 
price of the nontradeable good in an economy if the 
environmental good and nontradeable good are substitutes in 
consumption. The result of this relative price effect is 
important for analysis of the environment and unemployment 
effects. The effect on the relative price of the 
agricultural good may be summarized in the following 
proposition. 
Proposition 1. Suppose that there is a f actor(land) specific model o f a capital 
importing country, where the nontradable good market is W alras stable. Then, 
under the CC L capital tax system (i > i'), if the environmental good and the 
agricultural good are complements in consumption, then the higher the 
liberalization o f the capital market in the developing economy relative to the rest of 
the world the higher the relative price o f the nontradeable good. In other words, if 31 
the demand side effect dominates the supply side effect, f urther liberalization of 
the capital market will raise the relative price o f the nontradeable good .4 
2.3.4 The Environmental Effect 
This section analyzes the environmental effect of an  
increase in capital market liberalization.  Deforestation is  
used to refer to any increase in the use of land for  
agricultural production. Deforestation  lowers the welfare  
level of a consumer if the consumer values the environment  
cetris paribus. Conversely reforestation refers to the  
reduction in the use of land for agricultural production.  
Thus, reforestation increases welfare since its  
environmental effect is positive. The next step is to  
examine the effect of capital market liberalization on the  
environment for the factor specific model.  
As we have already observed in the previous section,  
the change of the environmental area  (forestry size) depends  
on the relative price of the nontraded good (P) and  capital  
(K). Hence, when the government changes its capital tax  
policy, it affects P and Z which then changes the size of  
forest area. Formally, the magnitude of changes in the size  
increases, the amount of forest land  of forest land (when Lx  
decreases) is a function of P and Z.  
4The developing economy here implies that the degree of capital market liberalization is vezy small (high 
1) and the environmental effect is very small. On the other initial capital investment tax rate, i.e., i  
hand, the developed economy implies that the environmental effect is large enough to dominate the  
foreign capital tax revenue effect  32 
L, = L,(P,Z)  (27) 
By taking total differentials of equation (27) with respect 
to the capital tax rate change,  I obtain 
dL,Idi= (dLsIdP)(dPIdi)+(dL,IdZ)(dZIdi)  0  (28) 
where the first term is the land effect in the agriculture 
sector through the price change and the second term is the 
land effect through the change in the amount of foreign 
capital. The sign of equation (28) is ambiguous  since the 
first term (dLr/dP > 0)(dP/di< 0) from the previous result is 
negative and the second term (dLxIdZ < 0)(dZIdi < 0)  is 
positive. Thus a further capital market liberalization could 
stimulate or reduce reforestation in an economy depending on 
the relative size of the price and foreign  capital effects. 
I, however, assume that the sign of equation  (28)  is  
negative because the land demand is likely to be more  
responsive to price change than to foreign capital change.  
This is a reasonable assumption because the real rental  
price of land is generally based on the inflation rate  
(price) and the land demand is more affected by its own  
industry's price effect than the cross-industry effect.  
Following this viewpoint, the lower investment tax rate  
increases the demand for land use in the agriculture sector,  
leading to a reduction of forest land. In other words, if a  
capital importing country lowers its investment tax rate,  
then the increase in land development in the agricultural  
(production of the  sector will result in more deforestation  33 
environmental good will be reduced). The following  
proposition explains the environmental effect.  
Proposition 2. Suppose there exists a f actor(land) specific model o f a capital 
importing country, where the nontradable good market is W alras stable. 
Then, under the CC L tax system (i > i*), the greater the capital market 
liberalization in a economy the more deforestation will occur if the environmental 
and the nontradeable goods are complements in consumption and the price effect 
dominates the foreign capital effect  in terms o f land demand. This will lead to less 
production o f environment goods. 
2.3.5 The Welfare Effect 
Now, we examine the welfare effect of lower capital  
tax rate. By taking the derivative of equation (18) with  
respect to tax rate i  ,  we have  
Eu  [pxpl  [pxz  d_Z  r(1  i)] di  En4-2 (29) di  di 
As you can see in equation (29), the welfare effect of the  
capital market becoming liberalized is ambiguous since the  
terms in (29) move in opposite directions. The term in the  
first set of brackets [P.Xp] is positive (see equation (16.))  
and the term dP  is negative from the previous result.
di  
Therefore, the sign of the price-induced-production effect  
[==1),Vialr] in a capital importing country is negative.  
The term in the second set of bracket wx,-1-17,1 in  
(29) shows that the production effect by foreign capital  34 
inflow is ambiguous depending on the relative  size of  
production of the nontradeable good (RX-z) and the tradeable  
good (17z). Thus, the sign of the foreign capital-induced-
production effect [P.YzHI-YAt is ambiguous.  
The term in the third set of brackets [r(1i)] 2  in  
(29) shows that the direct tax-induced foreign capital tax  
revenue effect is positive since  1- is negative (see  
equation (24)). However, the sign of the direct  foreign  
capital tax revenue effect is close to zero in a developing  
country because the initial foreign investment tax rate is  
higher in a developing country.  
Finally, the term in the last set of bracket  ( EQ1)  
in (29) shows that the environmental effect induced by a  
lower capital tax rate depends on the sign of q. As  
previously indicated, the environmental effect (V) is  
positive and the shadow value of the environmental good EQ  
is negative. Hence, the overall net environmental  effect is  
positive. The environmental effect is, however, very small  
in a developing country since a developing economy has less  
environmental awareness than a developed country does.  
Therefore, the net welfare effect in a developing  
economy is ambiguous because as  the capital market is  
further liberalized the production effect in the  
manufacturing sector (that was induced by the  increase in  
foreign capital (17z)) and the production effect  in the  
agriculture sector (that was induced by the  increase in  
foreign capital (PXz)) move in opposite directions. I,  35 
however, assume that the sign of the term in the second set  
[p x  yz] dcizi  of bracket  )  in equation (29)  is negative  
since the direct production effect (Yz)  is likely to  
dominate the cross-industry production effect (P.Kz) and the  
term 41 is negative. This implies that the developing  di 
country's welfare due to a further capital market  
liberalization will improve because of the increase in  
foreign capital tax revenue and because the environmental  
effect is close to zero in a developing country. The welfare  
level in a developed country will, however, deteriorate  
because the environmental effect due to the lower capital  
tax rate is likely to dominate the other effects in a  
developed country.  
In general, the net welfare effect depends on the  
production effect, the foreign capital revenue effect and  
the environmental effect. Thus, the net welfare effect  
depends on the relative size of the above effects.  
The welfare effect of lower capital tax rate may be  
summarized in the following proposition.  
Proposition 3. Suppose there exists a f actor(land) specific model o f a capital 
importing developing country, where the nontradable good market is W alras 
stable. Then, under CC L (i > i*), the higher the liberalization o f the domestic 
country's capital market the higher will be its own wel f are if the nontradeable and 
the environmental goods are complements in consumption . But, if the capital 
importing country is a developed country, the lower capital tax rate lowers the net 
production o f the environmental good and thus the net wel f are level deteriorates. 36 
Proposition 3 provides a case that contradicts the  
results from the traditional capital liberalization model by  
introducing an environmental effect into the model. A  
country with a strong environmental awareness such as  
developed countries will most likely be worse off as the  
capital market becomes more liberalized. On the other hand,  
a country with less environmental awareness such as a less- 
developed or developing country might be better off from an  
increase in capital market liberalization in spite of the  
fact that the production of the environmental good  
decreases.  
2.3.6 The Unemployment Effect  
Since the unemployment ratio is seen as a function of  
P and Z, p is expressed as  
(30)  P=A(/°,2%)  
To evaluate this equation,  I totally differentiate equation  
(30) with respect to the policy variable i. The expression  
for dµ /di is then  
= (dpIdP)(dPIdi)+  (dplaZ)(dZ Idi)  0  (31)  
where the term dplaP (see equation (16d)) is negative,but  
the term dP /di is negative from the previous  result. Thus,  
the first term (dpIdP)(dPIdi) is positive  which represents  
the indirect unemployment effect through price change. Also,  
the second term (dill&NdZidi) is positive  since the  
unemployment effect by foreign capital dplaZ is negative  
(see equation (16h)) and the foreign capital  effect dZ /di is  37 
negative. Consequently, the direction of the unemployment  
ratio in the urban sector is positive since both the first  
term and the second term are positive which implies that the  
lower investment tax rate reduces the unemployment  ratio in  
the urban sector.  
The following interesting observation can be drawn  
from this chapter: In a developing economy, the capital  
importing country by a further liberalization of the capital  
market will not only lower the unemployment but also improve  
its own welfare if the environmental and the  nontradeable  
goods are complements in consumption. On the  other hand, in  
a developed country the capital market liberalization policy  
will reduce the national wefare level, but also reduce  
unemployment. Therefore, the policy should be  directed  
towards a specific employment and environmental  target. To  
identify other effects on the endogeneous variables, we  
refer to Table 1, which summarizes the effects by showing  
the direction of movements in the endogeneous variables  
appearing in the upper-most row of the table when the  
investment tax rate changes. The term in parentheses in the  
left-most column of the table is used to  indicate that if  
Ex? > 0, then the environmental and the nontradeable goods  
are substitutes in consumption whereas if Ex2 < 0,  goods X 
and Y are complements in consumption.  38 
Table 1. General Equilibrium Long-Run Effects  
of A Lower Tax Rate  
P  ri,  ny  µ  Q Z U 
Developing economy  (EpQ > 0) +  ?  ?  + + 
Developing economy  (EpQ < 0) +  ?  ?  + + 
Developed economy (EN > 0)  +  ?  ? 
Developed economy  (EN < 0)  ? ? ? ?  ? + ? 
Thus far,  I have investigated the static effect of  
capital liberalization in the economy of a  small country  
under urban labor market distortions and  capital market  
distortions. I have shown that under certain conditions, the  
inclusion of the environment effect goes against  the  
conventional wisdom that a further capital market  
liberalization improves the national welfare  level in an  
economy.  
The analysis of this chapter has shown that a further  
capital market liberalization in a developing economy under  
the CCL system, will improve welfare  if certain conditions  
are met. On the other hand, a  further capital market  
liberalization in a developed country with a strong  
environmental awareness under the CCL system will reduce  
national welfare if the environmental and nontradeable goods  
are complements in  consumption. This result demonstrates the  
importance of the environmental effect in policy analysis  
because the result of capital  liberalization are contingent  
on the environmental effect. It is interesting to see that,  
although the direction of other variables such as  39 
unemployment and the price of the nontradeable good as  
result of the lower tax rate is the same in any economy, the  
results of the welfare analysis depends on whether the  
policy imposing country is a developing or a developed  
country (see Table 1). Thus, it is possible that a capital  
liberalization policy in a developing economy might bring  
about an increase in welfare for the host country by  
lowering unemployment and increasing of reforestation. On  
the other hand, it is also possible that the liberalization  
policy might introduce unfavorable outcomes such as a lower  
welfare level and higher unemployment. From this  
perspective, the policy should be applied differently in a  
country where the consumer places high value on the  
environment than in a country where the consumer places  
relatively little value on the environment. This different  
policy approach for different environmental valuations is  
not included in the existing literature on the result of  
capital liberalization policies. Thus, they are not able to  
provide the appropriate directions of changes in the general  
trade economy.  
Since the analysis of the other taxation rules can be  
studied through a similiar methodology and results in  
similiar outcomes as the CCL system, conducting policy  
analyses of the other taxation rules would be redundant. The  
limitations of the static model may be noted at this point.  
In the static model it is not possible to account for a  
growing environmental awareness over time. In order to  40 
accomodate a growing environmental awareness I can use a  
dynamic model to account for growth of environmental goods.  
A dynamic model is also useful because the agricultural  
sector can be modeled in a way that is responsive to the  
increasing globalization of the goods market (allowing the  
agricultural good to be tradeable). Additionally, the static  
model can not incorporate dynamic policies such as time- 
varying and temporary policies which are very common among  
international trading blocks. To overcome shortcomings of  
the static model,  I develop a dynamic model in the next  
chapter.  41 
CHAPTER 3.  
DYNAMIC ANALYSIS OF THE TAX POLICY EFFECTS ON THE  
ENVIRONMENT, UNEMPLOYMENT AND OTHER ENDOGENEOUS VARIABLES  
3.1 INTRODUCTION  
In the previous chapter, the direction and size of  
changes in welfare and environmental benefits were  
contingent on a one-shot (one-period) capital tax policy.  
However in recent years there has been an increase in the  
demand for environmental goods such as clean water, fresh  
air and balanced ecology. These, natural environmental goods  
are produced through a natural mechanism by using forest  
land. However, the land-use has been changing significantly  
in the past years by the industrialization policy of a  
developing country and the speculative reasons. This  
reflects not only that the land is the important element to  
determine the environmental benefits for human beings, but  
also that the land is a fundamental factor of production.  
Thus understanding the importance of land development and  
projecting future land development trajectories requires  
understanding the interactions of the basic human forces  
that motivate production and consumption in dynamic  setting.  
In this perspective, I look at how the environmental  
variable (land) and other variables evolve over time as the  
different investment policies are used in different time  42 
periods in this chapter. The time-varying policies are  
unanticipated temporary and permanent policies as well as  
gradual liberalization policy.  
It is necessary to look at some of the dynamic papers  
published in the past before proceeding further about my  
model. In the context of dynamic investment policy model,  
Some dynamic economic models that incorporate investment in  
physical capital input with respect to the permanent and  
temporary policy were presented by Abel (1982), Sen and  
Turnovsky (1990), Roldos (1991), Fisher and Turnovsky  
(1992). But, the above papers are only based on the  
unanticipated policy analysis instead of anticipated policy  
analysis with regard to the domestic capital investment in  
the framework of one sector. The early well-known one-good,  
infinite horizon model is represented by Blanchard (1983).  
On the other hand, the paper by Brock (1988) analyzes the  
optimizing infinite-horizon model that include traded and  
non-traded investment expenditure. However, no infinite  
horizon dynamic models incorporating foreign investment in  
the host country have been analyzed in the literature.  
Additionally, most of dynamic investment literature treats  
the domestic capital as an common asset. But, as I discussed  
at the beginning, the land as an asset is important  
phenomena in the developing countries where the  
industrialization policy is their main trade policy and the  
land speculation is very common.  43 
For example, in South-Korea, a survey conducted in  
1995 by the Korean Economic Review reported that one in  
every two South-Koreans faced with a windfall in income  
would spend the income on purchasing land as a personal  
asset. This situation is also well documented in other small  
countries with high population densities such as Taiwan,  
Hongkong, Singapore, and Japan. In Singapore, a survey  
conducted by the Marketing Service and Research Division of  
the Singrpore Press Holdings in October 1995, polled 565  
persons aged 15 and above, found that 91 percent chose land  
(property) as the most important asset to own.  
This is the major motivation behind this paper. By  
including land and foreign capital in a general equilibrium  
model,  I will be able to analyze the environmental effect of  
policy changes. The other unique feature of the model used  
in this chapter is that I use a three-good, three-sector  
model, in which the environmental good and forest sector are  
added to the traditional 2 x2 general framework.  
In this chapter, the previous static model will be modified  
slightly to incorporate these additional assumptions.  
I assume that the economy is composed of  infinitely- 
lived decision makers, consumers and firms. For simplicity,  
I assume that all consumers and all firms are identical,  
thus enabling the use of a representative consumer-producer  
or single agent. The domestic agent develops the  
agricultural land as his only asset. The development of land  
refers to the amount of forest land converted to agriculture  44 
land. However, the land does not provide income unless it is  
used in the production process. In addition,  I assume that  
unemployment is present in the urban sector because of the  
government imposed minimum wage distortion.  
The key assumption of this model is that the foreign  
country invests directly in the domestic country, but that  
the domestic country does not possess its own capital due to  
a lack of financial capital. Thus, the only capital input  
available for production is foreign capital. However,  
because capital has to be installed to be used in the  
production process, there is an installation cost associated  
with using capital.  
This chapter also presents the dynamic policy effects  
of unanticipated permanent, planned temporary, and planned  
gradual liberalization of the capital market, on land  
development and foreign capital investment as well as on the  
environment.  
This chapter is organized as follows. Section II  
describes the general dynamic model. Section III provides a  
formal temporary equilibrium solution when agricultural land  
and foreign capital stock is fixed. Section IV uses dynamics  
and provides a formal solution for the long-run analysis.5  
Section V discusses the effect of unanticipated permanent  
capital tax policy on endogeneous variables such as the  
environment, welfare, and unemployment. The basic solution  
51 use the term long-run and steady-state equilibrium interchangeably in this paper 45 
method of the rational expectations model is presented in  
Section VI. Section VII examines the dynamic policy effects  
of the gradual planned and the temporary capital market  
liberalization on the environment, foreign capital inflow,  
and land develoment.  46 
3.2 MODEL  
Consider a two-sector small open economy. The import  
sector operated by foreign firms produces a manufactured  
good Y using domestic labor and foreign capital,  (i.e.,  
Y".]((riy,2)). The export sector operated by domestic firms  
produces an agricultural good X using domestic labor and 
land,  (i.e., X = X(ns, Lx))  Both production functions are .  
concave and twice differentiable. In addition, although  
there are three areas (urban, rural and forest),  
manufacturing is always located in the urban area and  
agriculture is always located in the rural area.  
As a labor market policy, the government imposes a  
minimum fixed wage Tv in the labor market of the urban  
manufacturing sector, while the rural wage of the  
agriculture sector (w) freely adjusts to market conditions.  
The fixed minimum wage in the urban area is higher than the  
rural wage and thus induces migration from the agricultural  
sector to the higher-paying jobs in the urban sector. Thus,  
unemployment only exists in the urban area.  
For the capital market policy, the home country adopts  
a per unit tax system for foreign direct investment  in the  
home country. But, the foreign capital must be installed to  
be used for production and thus there are foreign capital  
installation costs OM per investment I in the home country  
where I denotes investment in foreign capital. For  47 
expositional convienence,  I assume that investments are  
financed through retained earnings.  
3.2.1 Domestic Sector Economy 
It is assumed that the exportable good X can be  
consumed (Cx) or invested in land investment (Lx). Then,  
the representative agent's plan is to maximize his  
intertemporal utility by choosing the optimal (7x, Cy, nr,  
and land development subject to his flow budget constraint,  
employment, and an initial condition.  
W = max frU(Cx, Cy)e-Otclt  
subject to  
the flow budget constraint  
PCx +Cy + PLx = PX(nx, Lx) + ITiny  T  (32) 
labor employment condition 
nx  ny(1  p) == 77  
and initial condition  
Lx(0) = L0  
where  
P = the world price of good X relative to good Y  
nx=the amount of employment in the agricultural sector  
ny=the amount of employment in the manufacturing sector  
p = the unemployment ratio in the urban sector  
70=.the fixed real wage rate in the urban area  
0= the rate of consumer time preference  
7'=. the size of government transfer payments  
Cx = the amount of consumption X  48 
Cy = the amount of consumption Y  
The world price of good X (P)  is fixed by the small country 
assumption and the instantaneous utility function U is 
assumed to be strictly concave in consumption Cx and Cy.6 
Furthermore, it is assumed that the two goods are 
complements in consumption and the marginal utility change 
(MUC) of its own good is greater than MUC of the cross good  
in absolute value (i.e., Pcxcx1>Ucxcy, lUcycyl >Ucxcy). For the  
representative consumer, the problem is to choose 
consumption goods Cx and Cy, labor in each sector nx, my, 
and the level of land development Lx, taking [3, w,  P and T, 
as given. To insure the existence of a steady-state 
solution, the consumer's rate of time preference 0  is taken 
to be equal to rate of the land cultivating cost 6, that is, 
the land converting cost from forest land to agricultural 
use. Another assumption is that the cost of reconverting 
from agricultural land to forest land is zero.  
On the domestic production side, the instantaneous 
production function of X(.) has the standard neoclassical 
properties of positive, but diminishing, marginal physical 
products. However, the homogeneity condition (constant 
return to scale) is not assumed for this production 
function. Another important restriction is that the input 
factors nx and Lx  are cooperative factors in the production 
6The following notation is applied. Partial derivatives are denoted by corresponding subscripts except Cx 
and Cy while the total derivatives of a function of a single argument are denoted by primes. Time 
derivatives are denoted by dots. 49 
of exportable good X.7 This assumption of cooperative  
factors is better fitted to an industry where the technology  
development for inputs is slow because two inputs in this  
type of industry are necessary inputs to the production  
process instead of substitutable inputs.  The agricultural  
industry is a good example of this type of industry since  
both land and labor are necessary inputs to the production  
of agricultural goods.  
3.2.2 Foreign Sector Economy 
It is assumed that the importable good Y can be  
consumed (Cy) or invested (/). Then, the representative  
foreign firm's plan in the foreign sector is to maximize its  
intertemporal profits by choosing ny and I subject to  
foreign investment growth and initial conditions:  
masfr{7ry  dt  
Try = {Y(ny, Z)  Tray  I  OM} 
subject to  
foreign investment growth  
2=/,  (33) 
and the initial condition 
Z(0) = 20 . 
where 
0==the rate of producer time preference which is equal to 
the rate of consumer time preference since the agent  is 
7This implies that  J-12cd, 
is positive.
dnr50 
a consumer-producer  
I = the domestic investment conducted by the foreign firm  
i =the rate of capital investment tax  
Z = the amount of foreign capital  
(/)(/) =capital installation cost function per  
investment I, which is convex. In addition, 0(0)=0,  
0'(0)=1 and O"(0) =1.8  
The production function Y satisfies the following  
properties:  
Y,, > 0, Yz > 0, Ynvnt, < 0, Yzz < 0  YtZ > 0 and YrtunvYZZ  Yn2vz >  0. ,  
The Hamiltonian for the domestic consumer's utility  
maximization problem is  
Hi. = e-13t[U(Cx, Cy) + A [PX(nx, Lx) + Tiny  PCx  Cy +7] 
+11)[N  nx  ny(1 + it)] ] 
where A is the shadow value of land and IP is the Lagrangian  
multiplier for the labor constraint.  
The Hamilitonian for the foreign firm's profit  
maximization problem is  
112 = e-at [[Y(ny, Z)  Tiny  (I + OM + iI)] + q11 
where q is the shadow value of capital.  
The formal derivation of the solution is in the  
Appendix. The results of the optimality conditions can be  
written as follows:  
8This assumption about the capital installation cost function has been made to simplify the presentation of 
the model. 51 
(34a)  Ucx(Cx, CY) = PA, 
Ucy(Cx, Cy) = A,  (34b) 
1 --1-4; 1-i = q,  (34c)  
= (f3  6)A,  (34d)  
= qi3 -Yz(ny, Z),  (34e)  
PLx = PX(nr, L.) -1-Funy  PCx  Cy,  (34f)  
2  (34g)  
T = iI  (34h)  
Lx) = w  (34i)  
Z) = iT)  (34j)  
PXL:(n., L.) = 6  (34k) 
Yz(ny, Z) = r  (341) 
where r is the return to foreign capital service and A and q 
are the co-state variables associated with the flow budget 
constraint (32) and foreign investment (33), respectively. 
In equation (34d), A is constant since the rate of time 
preference 0 is equal to the land cultivating cost 6  by 
assumption9. This implies that A is constant A  for time 
period t and is determined by the steady-state condition. 
Following Lucas (1967),  q  is the shadow value of foreign 
capital in physical terms. The relationship of equation 
(34c) might be solved by  
1.(q; i) 
where (DO is the function of  q  given i. The above 
investment relationship, with respect to the shadow value of 
91f Q is greater than 5, A approaches zero whereas A goes infinity if Q is smaller than 6. Thus, the case of 
0 6 is meaninigless in economic sense. 52 
foreign capital, is referred to as "Tobin's q" in the  
literature on investment (see Tobin (1969)).  
To rule out a Ponzi-type scheme in which the agent  
borrows an increasing amount from the rest of the world to  
finance current debt service payments, the usual terminal  
(transversality) condition is imposed:  
lirnALCM = 0.  
t,00  
In addition, another terminal (transversality) condition is  
imposed to preserve finite foreign capital stock in any  
steady state equilibrium:  
lim qZ7e-pt = 0 
t,m 
In implementing the optimality constraints of the general 
equilibrium,  I require the input resource employment 
equations (35)-(36): 
Lx+Lf.I  (35) 
nr+ ny(1 +  =N  (36) 
where p is the unemployment ratio in the urban sector, and 
p=nulny.1° Notice that land demand and supply for the 
agricultural sector Lx are not in equilibrium because there 
is a forest area, L1. Thus, the supply of land for the 
agriculture sector is not fixed. This variable supply of 
land would not be appropriate for a model that seeks to 
explain tax policy effects in developed countries since most 
1°n,, is the number of unemployed in the urban sector. 53 
developed countries have environmental regulations regarding  
converting land from forest to agriculture. However, less- 
developed or developing countries are less likely to have  
strong environmental regulations that reduce investment  
flows from foreign countries. Additionally, there is more  
forest area available for agricultural use in most less- 
developed or developing countries. Consequently land in  
developing or less-developed nations could be made available  
for agricultural use if the demand for land was high.  
Therefore, the assumption of variable land supply is more  
suitable to developing or less-developed countries.  
Since all workers in both sectors are allowed to move  
freely, we obtain the labor migration equilibrium equation  
between two sectors by solving the domestic country's  
intertemporal utility maximization.11  
w= w(1 +µ)  (37)  
Equation (37) says that the migration of labor continues  
until the expected wages in both sectors are equalized. With  
the exception of the international capital equilibrium  
condition which will be described in the next section,  
equations (34)-(37) complete the dynamic optimality  
conditions. Notice that the dynamic optimality conditions  
are a combination of the static and dynamic  optimal  
conditions.  
11This migration equilibrium condition is first introduced in a paper by Harris and Todaro (1970). See 
Appendix for solution method. 54 
3.3 THE TEMPORARY EQUILIBRIUM  
Under the model specified, I start my analysis of a  
Jynamic equilibrium with a growing stock of foreign capital  
and investment in domestic land. Before solving all of the  
dynamic paths, it will be useful to establish the  
relationships between relevant variables by first looking at  
equations (34a) and (34b). In temporary equilibrum, where  
the situation is characterized by an equilibrium of fixed  
stocks of assets such as agriculture land and foreign  
capital, the equations (34a) and (34b) can be solved for Cx  
N  
and Cy in terms of  l'A  and P:  
Cx = Cx(X P), aCx/aX < 0  (38)  
Cy -=-Cy(aj  P), acym'A <0  (39)  ,  
Since the two goods X and Y are by assumption complements 
in consumption, the increase in the marginal utility of 
domestic consumption for a given P implies lower 
consumption of both goods. More importantly,A  is determined 
in steady-state equilibrium. Thus, the marginal utility of 
consumption rAj  will play a crucial role in connecting the 
temporary and steady-state stage. Another important equation 
in the optimality conditions is equation (34c), in which the 
shadow price of foreign investment is equal to the marginal 
cost of foreign capital. As mentioned earlier, this 
relationship provides a Tobin q  investment functional form: 
I = I(q;i), WIN  > 0, al-0i <o.  (40a) 55 
In the production side of two sectors, the short-run 
equilibrium for ns,  ny,  5,  and r can be solved for a given 
Z and Lx from (34i)  (37)  . 
nx = nz(Lz,Z),  dnzl dLz > 0, dnzl dZ < 0  (40b) 
ny = ny(Lx, Z),  dnyl dLz = 0, dnyl dZ > 0  (40c) 
5 = b(Lz, Z),  d5I dLz <0,  dZ < 0  (40d) 
11= gLx, Z),  dLz <0,  dZ > 0  (40e) 
r = r(Lz, Z),  drI dLz = 0, drI dZ < 0  (40f) 
The derivations of results in equations (40b)  (40f) are 
shown in the Appendix. These results of the temporary 
equilibrium will provide information for analyzing the 
dynamics of the adjustment process and the long-run 
equilibrium. The complete summary of the temporary 
equilibrium equations are provided in the following 
equations: 
Consumption Side Static Equilibrium 
Ucx(Cx, Cy) = PA ,  (41a) 
Ucy(Cx, Cy ) =  ,  (41b) 
Production Side Static Equilibrium 
1+i+q5' =q,  (41c) 
PX,(nx, Lx) = w,  (41d) 
Yny(ny, Z) = ii3,  (41e) 
PXLr(nx, Lx) = S,  (41f)  
ir) = w(1-1-,a),  (41g)  
nx +ny(1-1-p) .1t1  (41h)  
Yz(ny,Z) =r  (41i)  
T =  (41j)  56 
Note that at this point in the temporary equilibrium, the  
consumer's endogeneous variables are a function of long-run  
variable rX. This implies that the temporary and long-run  
analysis are interrelated. Hence, the complete analysis of  
the consumer side equilibrium requires a long-run analysis.  57 
3.4 THE ADJUSTMENT PATH AND DYNAMIC OPTIMALITY CONDITIONS  
Substituting equations (40a) and (40e) into the  
dynamic optimality conditions, we establish the dynamic  
equations of motion. The new modified adjustment path of  
motion is as shown in the following equations:  
A=X  (42a)  
I (q;  (42b) 
4 = 40  Yz(ny(Z),Z)  (42c) 
PLx = PX(nx(Lx, Z), Lx) +11-my(2) + iI 
PCx(A)  Cy(A)  (42d) 
These equations represent dynamic processes of adjustment 
with parametric investment tax rate,  i,  and time preference, 
/3. Equations (42b)-(42d) indicate the recursive structure 
of the system. Two equations (42b) and (42d) comprise a 
system which jointly determines the dynamics of foreign 
capital, Z, and newly-installed foreign capital value, q. 
Substituting the solutions to (42b) and (42d) into the 
equation (42d), one can obtain the net adjustment path of 
land development. The solution of the system can be found by 
linearizing (42b) and (42c) evaluated at steady-state 
equilibrium. 
0 
[  (Yin,  YZZYnovVYnyn,  [Zq 
(43) 58 
where Z and q are the steady state values of Z and q, 
respectively. Note that the steady state is characterized by  
The stability of this system can be evaluated in  
terms of the trace and the determinant of the system. The  
determinant of the matrix of coefficients in (43)  is as  
shown  the following equation:  
D =  YzzYnovVYno, < 0. 
By the concavity property of the production function, the  
determinant of the coefficient matrix is negative, which is  
a necessary and sufficient condition for a saddle point. If  
the roots of the characteristic equations (43), al and a2  
are limited within a real and distinct number boundary, then  
they have opposite signs.12 Therefore, the general solution  
of the dynamic system can be described in the following  
form:  
Z = Z +  + A2ea2t  (44a) 
q =V + 9 Alea,e +  A2e2t  (44b) 
The arbitary constants, Al and 442, are determined by using  
initial and terminal conditions on Z and q. Throughout the  
dynamic analysis, I assume that al is negative and a2 is  
positive. Since the economy initially starts at Zo, the  
dynamic saddle solutions can be expressed in the form:  
Z= 2 .1-(Z)-2 )et  (45)  
q..V 1-1(26-2)eal,  (46)  
12cri = (P  1.1  44R )/2 < 0, a2 = (0 +  /Q2  44R  )/2 > 0. where 
R = 59 
The equation (46) features the relationships between the  
foreign capital and the shadow value of foreign capital. We  
can see that the shadow value of capital would decline more  
slowly (faster) than the foreign capital stock if  is  
smaller (greater) than /q.  
The next step is to derive the dynamic solution for  
land development, which is obtained by linearizing (42d)  
around the steady state value and substituting equation (46)  
into the linearized equation.  
Linearization of (42d) yields:  
PLx..i.4(7C1)+WX,S4HFPXLJ(Lxlx) 
+  Xn= z + 2711)(Z  Z ) 
Substitution of (46) into the above equation:  
PLx =  aft  )east az )(Z 
+  + P X Li(Lx  rilj  )  (47) 
where i denotes the initial foreign capital tax rate. Note  
that in deriving equation (47),  the previously assumed 
property of 0(.)  is maintained (0(0)=0,0'(0)=1 and 0"(0)=1). 
Assuming that the domestic economy starts out with an 
initial land stock,  Lx(0) = Lo,  the solution to (47)  is 
)ieet  (48) P Lx =  PrZ  + c0(Zo  )et-F[PLo PL  x  x  a,c1-0(Zo  60 
dn dn  dn where  = iai  wk 0 = PX  ± 6  w PX% and 6 =  PXLx dZ  dZ '  nr dLz 
The sign of 0 is positive since labor and land are assumed  
to be complements and the denominator of  -(1.7 is negative  
because 0 > 0 and al <0. However, the sign of n is ambiguous  
because it is contingent on the relative size of the  
investment tax revenue change, the extent of labor migration  
between sectors, and the complementarity effect between  
labor and capital. If  ae is negative  (i.e., Q is positive)  
then the input complementary effect must dominate the sum of  
tax revenue changes and migration effects due to a change in  
the foreign capital stock. This negative relationship  
between agriculture land and foreign capital stock produces  
a reforestation effect because as the foreign capital stock  
grows there is more land available for the production of the  
environmental good. On the other hand, if the relationship  
between agriculture land and foreign capital stock is  
positive, then deforestation will increase. Therefore, the  
sign of n determines whether or not the foreign capital  
inflow will produce reforestation or deforestation.  
Before assigning a specific sign to Q, It is  
necessary to define the within-industry marginal rate of  
technical input change (WMRTI) and the cross-industry  
marginal rate of technical input change (CMRTI). WMRTI is  
the amount by which one input can be changed when one extra  
unit of another input is used where each of the inputs is  
used to produce the same good. CMRTI is the amount by which  
one input can be changed when one extra unit of another  61 
input is used where each of inputs are used to produce 
different goods. For example,  dnxIdLx  is WMRTI since ms and 
Lx  are used in the production of the same output  )( whereas 
dnxIdZ  is CMRTI since nx and Z are used in the production of 
different goods X and Y, respectively. In general, WMRTI is 
greater than CMRTI in absolute value. This might be true in 
the short-run instesd of the long-run since CMRTI requires 
enough time for inputs to transfer to another sector. 
In a developing economy, the sign of n  is negative 
because the foreign capital revenue effect (ial)  is likely 
dn  to dominate the WMRTI effect (w--/) since the initial  dZ  
investment tax rate is high (ic'21). But, in a developed  
country, the sign of Sl is positive because the WMRTI effect  
_dn  /  (kxl  (7D-1)  is greater than the cuitiy, by the assumption Tv>w and  dZ  
the initial tax rate is small in a developed country. 
Therefore, the sign of n  in a developing country is 
negative whereas it is positive in a developed country. This 
result is equivalent to saying that developing economies 
start with an initial land stock that is lower than the  
steady-state equilibrium and developed economies start with  
an initial land stock that is higher than the steady-state  
equilibrium. Consequently,  -2-7 will always be positive in  
the developing country. The following analysis is based on  
the developing economy model.  
By using the transversality condition of foreign  
capital stock and (48),  I obtain the intertemporal budget  
constraint and the land development path of the economy:  62 
Prr,  = PLo  (Zo  ),  (49) 
PL, = PL + --cLA(Zo  2 )eal t  (50) 
--y 
The intertemporal budget constraint in (49)  provides for a  
relationship between the development and the stock of  
foreign capital. In addition, this equation prevents the  
consumer from borrowing forever which is a critical  
assumption in the analysis of this dynamic system. The  
relation in equation (50) shows that the growth of foreign  
capital stock stimulates land development in the developing  
economy, which leads to deforestation of land. That is, the  
coefficent of foreign capital stock is positive for the  
developing economy. Finally, the international capital  
investment equilibrium equation under the per-unit 
investment tax policy: 
Fr; -iI = 71r"jg *  (51) 
where superscript * denotes the foreign country variable and  
n is the steady-state equilibrum profit of foreign industry  
in the host country. The foreign variable is assumed to  
remain unchanged by the small country assumption.  
Additionally, equation (51) implies that foreign capital  
investment occurs until the net return on each unit  of  
capital investment is equalized in both countries. However,  
in the long-run, the investment of a foreign company  
operating in the domestic country continues  until profit is  
driven to zero. Therefore, the steady-state  international  
capital investment equilibrium condition is always  
satisfied. This completely specifies the dynamic and long-63 
run steady-state equilibrium conditions of a small country  
economy.  
The dynamic Equations :  
Z =  + (zo  )  (52a) 
g =CY +  (Zo  )eco  (52b) 
PLr = Pr, x + e-7(zo  )eco  (52c) 
As described earlier, the long-run or steady-state is 
characterized by Z = Lx = 4 = I = 0 and defined by a steady-
state equilibrium (C x,  all',  r4j  ,  n r,  y  Lj x  Z,  ist)  I 
)  such that 
Consumption Side Steady  State 
Ucr(6 x,  Y)=PrX ,  (53a) 
Ucy(d x,  Y) =3t  (53b) 
Production Side Steady  state 
(53c) 
(53d) 
(53e) 
(53f) 
(53g) 
(53h) 
(53i) 
(53j) 
(53k) 
The Budget Constraint 
PX( r,  )  L y = P X ± ro Y  (531) 
The Intertemporal Budget Constraint 
Prix  = PLo  0,Q 0(Zo  )  (53m) 64 
The Government Transfer Payments 
Y  =0  (53n) 
The Profits of Foreign Company in The Home Country 
y = 0  (53o) 
Land Input Resource Constraint 
ri. + ff  = E  (53p) 
rif-' 
In deriving these steady-state equilibrium conditions, the 
earlier assumptions about foreign capital investment cost 
function 0(0) = 0,  Oi(0) =1 and ou(0) .1, are applied. In the 
next section, the long-run steady-state effect of investment 
tax policy change on consumption, labor, unemployment and 
environment will be investigated. Then, in the following 
section, the dynamic policy effect will be analyzed. 65 
3.5 LONG-RUN EFFECTS Of A FURTHER CAPITAL MARKET  
LIBERALIZATION DUE TO THE LOWER PERMANENT  
CAPITAL TAX RATE  
3.5.1 The Foreign Capital Stock E f fect 
Before analyzing the specific effect, we can observe  
that steady-state equilibrium system in equations (53a)-
(53p) features the usual separation of consumption,  
production, and investment decisions. In other words, we can  
regroup the steady-state system such that  
the consumption decision (53a),  (53b) and (531) determines  
and the marginal welfare X,  the investment  
decision (53c),  (53k) and (53m) determines V, 25x and 2,  
and the production decision (53d)-(53p) determines Wx,?ty,  
irslj   tal 97-I and 6  for a given /5x and Z.  
The long-run effects of a further capital market  
liberalization on the endogeneous variables can be achieved  
through the second group of simultaneous steady-state  
equilibrium equations (53c),  (53k) and (53m). Since the main  
focus of this paper is to analyze the environmental welfare  
effect and unemployment effect of higher capital market  
liberalization,  I shall concentrate my exposition on those  
areas. The effects of higher capital market liberalization  
on all of the other endogeneous variables are summarized in  
Table 2  (page 79) .  
If the capital tax rate i in the domestic country is  
permanently lowered, the steady-state equilibrium price  66 
(shadow value) of foreign capital decreases from equation  
(53c). The resulting reduction in the price of foreign 
capital (the low cost of capital) leads to a rise of foreign 
capital stock in the domestic country from (53k). Therefore, 
the net effect on foreign capital stock will be positive. 
Clearly an increase of the shadow price of capital promotes 
foreign capital stock inflow. Hence, the greater the 
liberalization of the domestic capital market through the 
lowering of the foreign capital investment tax rate, the 
higher the level of foreign capital stock in the domestic 
market. This result is summarized in Proposition4. 
Proposition 4. In the long  run foreign capital increases in the domestic market 
when the capital market is further liberalized due to a lower permanent domestic 
capital tax rate. 
Proof.  
By solving the system of equations (53b),  (53k) and (53m),  
simultaneously, we get the expression for d2/di  
dr2Idi=1311DI 
where IDI=Yzn,--2fj+Yzz is the determinant of the simultaneous  
equation system (53b),  (53k) and (53m).  
To determine the sign of  we use the result of the 
temporary equilibrium in equation (40c)  (i.e.,  dnyldZ > 0  and 
dnyldLx = 0) .  By substituting these results back into the 
above equation, the total effect on the foreign capital is 
dZ kii=  (54) 
lizzYnidny  Y4,,Z 67 
v 
Thus, the sign of d2/di depends on the sign of YzzYnot,   177,2,z  
because the sign of the numerator is negative. However, a  
further capital market liberalization leads to an increase  
in foreign capital imports if we assume that the production  
Yz z Ynynv K2 z function is concave (IDI  < 0) f  since the term 11,,ti n =  V 
YrItirly 
would then be negative by the assumption of diminishing  
return to labor input. This is the expected result where  
further capital market liberalization results in more  
capital stock inflow into the domestic economy. The main  
factor in this rise in foreign capital stock inflow is that  
the cost of manufacturing sector reduces due to the lower  
investment tax.  
3. 5 . 2  Deforestation E f f ect 
I now consider the deforestation effect of increased  
capital market liberalization in the permanent per unit tax  
system. As the capital market is further liberalized due to  
the reduction of the investment tax rate i,  the general  
equilibrium deforestation effect remains ambiguous because  
it depends on the net capital tax revenue. To establish the  
sufficient conditions under which increased capital  
liberalization (through the reduction of the investment tax  
rate i on the domestic net capital tax revenue) leads to  
deforestation or reforestation in a small capital importing  
country,  I will use the investment decision equations (53b),  
(53k) and (53m). By differentiating these equations with  68 
respect to investment tax rate i and using Cramer's Rule I  
obtain the following expression for dfx/di:  
d rfx  2:90  (ZO  (55) 
or  drx/di =  ct9 41- (zo  Z )el-e}/{1D1}  (56) 
Equation (56)  is derived by substituting ci from (54) into  
(55). In deriving (55),  I assumed that 0 is only second  
order differentiable with respect to tax rate i. Generally,  
capital markets tend to move towards steady-state capital  
equilibrium since the initial economy in the capital market  
is assumed to be at disequilibrium (Zo<Z). The first term  
61# (policy effect) and the second term  (Zo  Z )el-6 
(disequilibrium effect) in (55) move in opposite directions  
when the investment tax rate is lowered in the developing  
country. Therefore, the change in the land stock  
(agriculture land) due to the lower investment tax rate in  
the developing country remains ambiguous and depends on the  
relative size of the two terms. The lower tax rate policy is  
likely to be less effective if the initial capital shortage  
is great. This might be happen in developing countries  
because there is usually a large capital shortage in  
developing countries. Thus, the effect of capital  
liberalization policies on the environmental good in a  
developing country is likely to be weaker than in a  
developed country. In general, since the disequilibrium  
effect (the second term in (55)) and the foreign capital  69 
policy effect (the first term in (55)) move in opposite  
direction, one can find the policy-neutral point 6 where  
the disequilibrium effect is offest exactly by the foreign  
capital effect. That is, the capital market liberalization  
policy does not have any effect on land demand at point 6.  
6 can be obtained by setting drx/di=.0 in equation (55) and  
written as follows:  
zo.(vd:4)+2 =6  (57)  
This is a very interesting result because land demand in the  
agricultural sector (due to the lower investment tax rate)  
decreases if the initial foreign capital Zo is less than 6  
(the capital shortage effect dominates the policy effect).  
On the other hand, the agricultural land demand is increased  
by the lower capital tax rate if the capital policy effect  
dominates the capital shortage effect. Thus, the land demand  
in the agricultural industry depends on how much initial  
foreign capital is invested in the host country. This  
implies that the policy effect is stronger if the initial  
foreign capital shortage effect is very small. This  
indicates that the capital liberalization policy is more  
effective in developed countries than in developing  
countries since the developing countries tend to have much  
higher capital shortages.  
In the case of a developed country, the sign of (55)  
is also positive because the first term is positive by  70 
S2> 0. Therefore, a lower investment tax lowers the demand  
for agriculture land development and thus leads to  
reforestation. The following proposition states the land  
effect of further capital market liberalization.  
Proposition 5. I f the developing economy starts with a shortage o f foreign capital, 
then a reduction in the capital investment tax rate stimulates reforestation when 
the initial economy starts below the policy-neutral point and deforestation if the 
initial economy operates above the policy  neutral point. In a developed country, 
the lower investment tax rate stimulates reforestation. On the other hand, if the 
initial developing economy starts at a steady -state equilibrium in the foreign 
capital market, the lower capital tax rate encourage the deforestation. 
Proof. 
The first result in Proposition5.  was already proved in the 
discussion following equation (56) .  For the second result, 
if the initial foreign capital market in a developing 
country starts at steady-state capital equilibrium, the sign 
of equation (55) depends on the sign of the term dZ  since 
the second term is zero and n  is negative in a developing 
economy. Hence, the further capital market liberalization 
increases the land demand for agriculture because the term 
di  is negative. This increase in land demand for the 
agricultural sector reduces the availability of land for the 
forestry area and thus stimulates deforestation. 
For the rest of the analysis,  I will assume that the  
initial developing economy operates above the policy-neutral  71 
point and thus the policy effect is greater than the capital  
shortage effect. Then, further capital market liberalization  
will increase agricultural land demand, leading to  
deforestation. The opposite result would, however, take  
place if the assumption was reversed.  
The positive assumption for the sign of the  
OQ   i  coefficient --7 in a developing economy may not be true.  cq-v  
Hence, we should be very careful in applying this result in  
a policy context.  
In my earlier discussion,  I assumed that the domestic  
economy always starts at the non-steady-state foreign  
capital equilibrium. This was done to reflect the fact that  
positive foreign capital investment is normal for most  
economies. Therefore, the developing economy model provides  
the results that the reforestation process is further  
stimulated when there is an increase in the liberalization  
of the capital market. This result is illustrated  
graphically in Figure 3.1. Empirical research could also be  
used to test this result.  
3.5.3 Unemployment Effect 
In most countries, economic policy is targeted towards  
reducing unemployment. Consequently,  I will explore the  
unemployment effect of a domestic government's capital  
market liberalization policy. To analyze the unemployment  
effect,  I will write the unemployment ratio as a function of  
agricultural land and foreign capital stock:  72 
Lx 
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= (L  ) 
Differentiation of this equation yields:  
dri,  di = (WI la x)(dz  di) + (aiel  (32 )(drg  di)  0  (58) 
The sign of (58) depends on the sign of each term. Using 
results from the temporary equilibrium model that were used 
in the previous section, the effect of the unemployment  
ratio on the manufacturing sector in a developing country  
is negative if the initial economy operates below the  
policy-neutral point 6 and ambiguous if the initial economy  
operates above the policy-neutral point 6. This result is  
due to the fact that the first term AY/OL,Oar/di) in (58)  
is negative because the term (ait/As) is negative (see 
equation (40e)) and the term (ax/di)  is positive (negative) 
if the initial economy operates below (above) the policy-
neutral point (see Proposition5) .  On the other hand, the 
second terms (via2)(aldi) are negative (see equation 
(40e)). This implies that the reduction of the investment  
tax rate raises the unemployment ratio in the urban sector  
if Zo <6 whereas if Zo > C7 then the effect on the  
unemployment ratio is ambiguous.  
Equation (58) shows that the unemployment effect is  
ambiguous (if the policy imposing country starts in  
equilibrium in the capital market) because the first and the  
second term move in opposite directions (see proposition 5).  
If the land-induced unemployment effect oritla.)(a.10) is  
greater than the foreign capital-induced unemployment effect  74 
,  (AY la 02  the unemployment ratio drops in the urban  
sector.  
In the developing country case where the initial 
capital market starts at equilibrium (Zo2 ..  ),  if the 
investment tax rate of i is lowered, more foreign capital 
stock flows into the developing economy due to Proposition4. 
Since more foreign capital is available to the urban 
manufacturing sector, the demand for labor in the 
manufacturing sector rises (labor and capital are 
cooperative factors in the production process). The increase 
in employment opportunities then stimulate labor migration 
from the rural sector. This provides a negative impact on 
unemployment. In addition, from Proposition5,  the lower 
investment tax rate also stimulates land development and 
leads to an increase in labor demand in the agricultural 
sector. This increase in labor demand promotes a reverse 
labor migration from the urban sector. This reverse 
migration provides a positive impact on unemployment in the  
urban sector. As a result, the net unemployment ratio in the  
urban sector remains ambiguous.  
If the developing country starts initially in  
disequilibrium (Zo <  ) with Zo < 6, the lower tax rate  
lowers the demand for agriculture land which increases the  
unemployment ratio by labor migration to the urban sector.  
This reinforces the increase in unemployment already induced  
by the foreign capital inflow (see the above paragraph).  
Thus, the unemployment ratio in the urban sector will always  75 
increase when the capital market is more liberalized in the  
developing country if Z0 < 6. But if Z0 > 6, the unemployment  
effect is ambiguous. The following proposition summarizes  
the results of this section.  
Proposition 6.  I f the initial developing economy operates in the range o f Zo >  6, 
the direction o f a change in the unemployment ratio in the urban sector due to an 
increase in capital market liberalization is ambiguous. On the other hand, the 
unemployment ratio in the urban sector will increase with increased liberalization 
i f the initial developing economy operates at the range o f Zo < 6) . 
3.5.4 The Marginal Utility Of The Wealth Effect 
Thus far, we have determined the effects of market 
liberalization on unemployment, foreign capital importation 
and land development. Now,  I will investigate the general 
equilibrium long-run effect of a lower foreign capital 
investment tax policy on the marginal utility of wealth, 3,j. 
This leads to the following proposition. 
Proposition 7 .  A further capital market liberalization in the developing country 
provides a lower marginal utility o f wealth if the utility function is not linearly 
homogeneous and the land asset effect dominates the employment effect in the 
rural sector. 
Proof. 
By differentiating equations (53a) and (53b) and using  
(531), equation (59) can be derived.  76 
U2x  C UC C Y CCy  XX Y dA Idi= (2PUcxcy-P2uCyCy (59)
-UCxCx 
where V = PXt +PXL,rt +17)dr-0. The term in parentheses in 
equation (59)  is negative because of the assumption that the 
utility function is concave whereas the sign of V is 
uncertain and depends on the relative size of the land and 
employment effects. Thus, the net effect on the marginal 
utility of wealth is ambiguous. The sign of V depends on 
the sign of tt,  and fiTli?.  The labor effect (1i/  )  in the 
agriculture sector and the agriculture land effect (It )  
are positive if Zo<e(see (40b) and the defintion of WMRTI  
and CMRTI)  whereas the employment effect  induced by  )  
(  c-121  
the foreign capital inflow in the manufacturing sector is  
negative by equation (40c). Consequently, the sign of V is  
ambiguous. But, in developing countries such as South-korea  
and Sinagapore the income change will result in a strong  
land asset effect. For this reason, I assume that the land  
asset effect 
(  in developing countries dominates the  1/
)  
foreign capital effect 
( t/ )  and thus the sign of V will  
depend on the sign of If. This implies that the sign of V  
is positive if the initial economy operates in the Zo <  
range. As a result, the sign of (59)  is negative because the  
term in parentheses in (59)  is negative. This would lead to  
higher marginal utility of wealth as the investment tax rate  
is lowered if Zo< (5. However, the sign of (59)  is positive  
because V is negative if Zo > C5  (see  (40b) and the defintion  
of WMRTI and CMRTI).  Notice that the marginal utility of  
wealth rAj  remains constant if the utility function is  77 
linearly homogeneous in consumption because the term in the  
parenthesis is equal to zero.  
In the developed country case, the marginal utility of  
wealth decreases because of the lower investment tax rate  
since the terms /;- and V are positive.  
3.5.5 Welfare Effect  
I now consider what happens to national welfare in the  
presence of two distortions. These distortions are the  
rigidity of the urban sector wage and the provision of a  
capital investment tax system. The national welfare for this  
two sector economy equals the utility, U(Cx,Cy). By  
assumption, U is strictly quasi-concave. Hence, the effect  
of the reduction in the capital tax rate on economic welfare  
is closely related to the level of consumptions of each  
good. By differentiating equations (53a),  (53b),  (531) and  
using the previously obtained results,  I get  
(UcxCy- PUCyCy)  V dCx/di=  (60)
2PUcxcy P2 Ucycy -UCxCx 
(PUcxCy -UCxCx)  v dCY Idi =  (61)
2PUcxcy PzUCyCy-UCXCX 
The signs of both equations (60) and (61) in a developed  
country with Zo < 2, are negative since the term V is  
assumed to be negative by assumption Zo> 6. Thus, national  
welfare increases as the capital market is further  
liberalized, because utility is positively related to  
consumption.  
This result can be explained in the following fashion.  
A reduction in the capital tax rate increases the foreign  78 
capital stock in the domestic country due to the lower  
marginal investment cost. The consequent rise in foreign  
capital stock induces higher labor employment in the  
manufacturing sector because labor and foreign capital are  
cooperative factors in production. But, in the rural sector,  
the more foreign capital inflow lowers labor supply in the  
agriculture sector because of labor migration to the urban  
sector. For the agricultural land demand, the lower  
investment tax rate increases the demand for agricultural  
land because of the higher income. This increase in the  
agriculture land demand raises the employment of labor in  
the rural sector because land and labor are cooperative  
factor inputs. As a result, the net employment in the rural  
sector is higher (due to IWMRTII > ICMRTII). However, in the  
previous section,  I found that the land demand increases as  
the market becomes further liberalized. This increase in the  
land demand is induced by the higher income effect since  
land is asset. The higher income increases not only land  
demand but also the consumption of both goods X and Y. The  
results would be reversed if the initial economy operated in  
the Z0 <  range.  
The net result is that further capital market  
liberalization (through lowering the capital tax rate)  
improves national welfare via the income effect if welfare  
only depends on the  level of consumption and the initial  
foreign capital Zo is greater than G. However, if the  
environmental effect (deforestation) is included in the  79 
utility function, national welfare may not improve with  
increased in capital market liberalization. Generally, an  
increase in deforestation due to a reduction in the capital  
tax rate will reduce the utility of the consumer. Thus, the  
net national welfare effect is ambiguous and depends on the  
relative size of the deforestation and consumption effects.  
The inclusion of an environmental good in the utility  
function is discussed in the next chapter. Other endogenous  
variable effects from the lower capital tax rate are  
summarized in Table 2. This table shows the direction of  
movement in the endogeneous variables which appear in the  
upper-most row of the table, when an unanticipated permanent  
investment tax rate is lowered. The abbreviations D.E and  
D.E.D which appear in the left-most column of the table 
stand for developing economy and developed economy, 
respectively. The term <6 (>6)  denotes Zo < 6 (Zo > (5). 
The term Zo< implies that the initial foreign capital is 
equal to or smaller than steady-state equilibrium 2. 
Finally, the term Zo < denotes that the initial economy  
starts with a shortage in capital.  
Table 2. Unanticipated Permanent Capital Liberalization  
n,  ny  b  ki  w Cx Cy Q  U 
D.E(Zo<, <6)  +  ?  +  +  
D.E(Zo<, >6) + +  ?  ? + +  +  
D.E (Zo = )  + +  ?  ? + +  +  
D.E.D(Zo<)  +  ?  +  80 
3.6 TRANSITIONAL DYNAMICS AND CAPITAL MARKET LIBERALIZATON  
I shall now investigate how dynamic variables such as  
foreign capital and land evolve over time as the economy  
moves toward more capital liberalization. The various  
investment tax policies over the different time periods have  
been included in the model to increase realism because most  
countries in the world have their own tax policies. To  
incorporate the variable tax policies over the different  
time periods,  I adopt Buiter's (1984) solution technique  for  
continuous time models. This technique provides a way to  
incorporate rational expectations into the model as  well as  
any combination of permanent or  transitory and anticipated  
or unanticipated shocks.  
The economic agent is viewed as holding expectations  
with complete subjective certainty to make the system  
deterministic since it is possible that the actual and  
anticipated shadow value of foreign capital might not  
coincide. However, it is normally true that  the actual and  
anticipated asset variables do coincide when new information  
becomes available. Another important assumption is that the  
economy initially starts off in a steady-state equilibrium.  
This reflects the fact that land development  and capital  
investment are normally growing in a developing economy. To  
arrive at a solution to this linear systems with rational  
expectations, the previous linear system (41a)  is used.  81 
Et(2)1  0  Ie  rEtz)  r 
L L LEt(4)]  0  E((q) 
-
A[Et(Z)  Z 
Et(q)V 
(62) 
where Et  denotes the expectation operator formed at time t.13 
The characteristic roots of A  are al and a2, where al is the 
negative root and a2 is the positive root. The 
diagonalization of matrix A  allows for A = V-laV where a is 
a diagonal matrix whose diagonal elements are  the 
characteristic roots of A.  V is also a 2 x 2 matrix whose 
rows are linearly independent left eigenvectors of A. The 
elements of V are V11 = V21  = 1, V12-(al  A11)/A21  < 0, and 
V22 = (A22  ai)/A21 > O. The elements of V-1  consist of Wii where 
all elements except W21  are positive. The matrices A, B, V, 
V-1  and a are represented in the following form: 
A11 = 0  Al2 = lq  = V 1.2  A21 
Yr,2,-YnoYZZ  V A  V22= A21 =  ynov  A22 =  V21 = 
W12 =  =-1-21  [ Bi = Z. _11 [ /471-112L 1  15---2ai  al  0  B 0-2oti  V-1 =  a  = 
'  0 a2  [  B2 = 0  j W22 =  )3"-lit W21  alai 
' 
1-0
By solving forward for the shadow value of investment,  q, 
and backward for the foreign capital variable, Z, we get 
the closed form solutions for q  and Z 
q(t) =C1 +W211471-11 (Z (t)  Z )  v221B1ft(x)Et(i(u)  i)e-2(t-u)du  (63) 
Z(t) = Z + (Zo  Z )east + Bifo(i(s)  i)eal(t-s)ds 
13The time subscript is supressed to avoid notational confusion. 82 
Al2V221B1foleal(t-3),CEs(i(U)  i)ea2(3-u)dUdS  (64) 
where the investment tax rate i is evaluated at  The  
relationship between the agricultural land and foreign  
capital stock over time can be established by using equation  
(52c). The result is:  
PL  --Q-2  (65) 
or  0, Z  (66) 
Equation (63) implies that the shadow value of capital  
investment in time period t depends on the current foreign  
capital shortage (Z(t)  2)  and current expectations of the  
future values of capital investment tax rates. Foreign  
capital inflow or outflow in equation (63) depends on the  
past realized values of investment tax rates, the  
expectations in all previous periods s of the value of  
capital investment tax rate in periods beyond s, and  the  
initial deviation value of  foreign capital from its steady- 
state value. Intuitively, as the current foreign capital  
shortage increases, the price of foreign capital (shadow  
value of capital) increases since the coefficient of the  
current capital shortage W21147-1 is negative. In other  
words, the increase of the net current foreign capital  
demand raises the current price of foreign capital stock. In  
the capital market liberalization policy case, if a lower  
investment tax rate is expected in the future, then the  83 
current price of foreign capital stock is decreased. This is  
due to the fact that the investor will lower his current  
foreign capital demand to take advantage of the future lower  
investment tax rate. This reduction in the current foreign  
capital demand lowers the current price of the foreign  
capital stock. Thus, the current price of the foreign  
capital stock depends on the current foreign capital market  
disequilibrium and the future policy expectation.  
The current foreign capital inflow or outflow in  
equation (64) depends on the past realized values of  
investment tax rates, the expectations in all previous  
periods s of the value of capital investment tax rate in  
periods beyond s, and the initial deviation value of foreign  
capital from its steady-state value. In other words, the  
foreign capital effect depends on the initial capital  
shortage and the policy (current and future policy) effects.  
If the initial capital shortage effect dominates the policy  
effect, then the policy has less effect on the inflow of  
foreign capital in the adjustment period. This is more  
likely to happen in a developing country since the capital  
shortage in a developing country is greater than that in a  
developed country.  
The capital shortage effect on the foreign capital  
inflow with respect to time is positive because the economy  
tends to move towards the steady-state equilibrium. Thus,  
the foreign capital inflow increases if the capital shortage  
(disequilibrium) effect dominates the policy effect. In  84 
general, equation (64) implies that the movement of the  
current foreign capital stock over time is unknown when the  
currrent tax rate is lowered or when a  lower investment tax  
rate is expected in the future because the  initial foreign  
capital shortage effect (Zo-2) moves in the opposite  
direction from the future investment tax effect. On the  
other hand, if the current investment tax rate is lowered,  
the investor increases his current investment over time to  
take advantage of the lower tax rate and thus  reduces the  
foreign capital demand since the initial capital  shortage  
effect moves in the same direction as the capital  
liberalization policy. As a result, the movement  of the  
current foreign capital stock over time depends on the  
relative size of the initial foreign capital shortage,  the  
current capital liberalization policy and the future capital  
liberalization policy effects.  
The last two equations (65) and (66) provide very  
important relationships between the environmental  good and  
the foreign capital stock when the time t and the investment  
tax rate i change at the same time.  This equation implies  
that the direction in the production of the environmental  
good over time depends on the foreign capital movement over  
time since the term Q is determined in earlier discussion.  
In a developing country, the current agricultural stock  
moves in the same direction as the foreign capital stock  
o  --7 is positive  over time because the coefficient term  
since the term SI is negative in a developing economy. Thus,  85 
if the foreign capital increases over time, the agricultural  
stock increases over time, leading to the lower production  
of the environmental good due to deforestation (see (66)).  
On the other hand, when the country is developed, then the  
increase of foreign capital reduces the agricultural stock  
over time, leading to a higher production of the  
environmental good due to reforestation since the term n is  
positive in a developed country. Therefore, the direction of  
the environmental good production will be known as long as  
the direction of the foreign capital stock movement is  
known.  
Before proceeding any further,  I will assume that in  
this dynamic rational expectation model, the future policy  
change has significant impact on the current variables but  
it is a smaller effect than the current policy change.  86 
3.7 THE PATH OF FOREIGN CAPITAL, LAND AND UNEMPLOYMENT IN  
RESPONSE TO TIME-VARYING CAPITAL MARKET LIBERALIZATION  
POLICIES  
In this section, we analyze the effect of permanent,  
temporary, unanticipated and anticipated policy shocks in  
the CCL capital investment tax system. The time frame is  
subdivided into t1,  t2 and t3 where 4 is the time when the  
policy shock is first announced. I assume that the policy  
shock takes effect at time t2 and that the policy shock  
terminates at time t3.  If time 4 and t2 coincide, then this  
policy is unanticipated. If time t3=oo, then it is  
permanent.  
3.7.1  Unanticipated Permanent Capital Market Liberalization 
The result of the unanticipated permanent capital  
investment tax policy was previously discussed using the  
static model and now will be reconsidered using the dynamic  
model.  
I assume that the government announces at 4 that the  
capital investment tax rate will be i which is lower than i.  
However, the change is not expected at any time previous to  
t1. This capital market liberalization policy is believed  
with certainty to be permanent. First,  I will analyze the  
foreign capital stock movement and then use equation (66) to  
investigate the environmental effect.  
From equation (64), the path of foreign capital in the  
different time periods is shown as follows:  87 
o < t <  z(t)  + (zo  )e-ii  (67) 
t1 < t,  Z(t) = Z + (Zo  Z )et + (B1  i)(7  i)ftietli(t-3>cis  (68) 
where E is Al2Y221E4, which is negative. Since the current  
effect(E4) is greater than the future expectation effect(2)  
by assumption, the dynamic path of the foreign capital  
inflow after the increase of capital market liberalization  
is higher than that of the no-change scenario. This increase  
in the foreign capital stock increases the agricultural land  
stock over time in a developing country by equation (66),  
leading to the reduction in the production of the  
environmental good due to deforestation.  
In the long-run analysis, the new steady-state foreign 
capital stock after the permanent capital tax rate change is 
trii  (2  (B1-4)(-1)  )  which is greater than the initial steady-
cti  
state equilibrium 2.  This new steady-state equilibrium Z 
is obtained by allowing the time period t to go to infinity  
in equation (68). To obtain the long-run agricultural land  
stock equilibrium,  I rewrite equation (55) for convenience  
in equation (69) by slightly modifying  
A fx/AP = oc'  (z0  ).-s-q.°  (69) 
where IF and A denote the policy variable and the discrete  
change, respectively. The IF and A are used to capture  
general and discrete policy variables since the coming  
sections illustrate several different discrete policy  
choices. In equation (55),  IF is unanticipated permanent  88 
investment tax rate i.  The first term in (69) is the income  
effect by the policy change through the foreign capital  
stock change whereas the second term is the capital  
disequilibrium effect.  
In a developing country, the first term and the second  
term move in opposite direction if the policy is  
unanticipated permanent foreign capital liberalization. This  
is due to the fact that the term  (P=i)  is negative, the  
coefficient  Pc2,,  is positive (0 <0) and the initial shortage  av-v  
of foreign capital. Therefore, at some point the  
disequilibrium effect and the policy effect offset each  
other exactly and then the policy does not affect the long- 
run agricultural land stock  (dt/a==()). To be consistent  
with the previous section,  I denote this point as 6  
(policy-neutral point). This policy-neutral point 6 can be  
derived by setting dt/c0==0 and can be expressed by 2b.  
The long-run steady-state equilibrium relationship of  
the policy change between Lx and Z from equation (69)  
asserts that the increase in the new foreign capital steady- 
state equilibrium Z induces the higher new Lx because long- 
run land stock moves in the same direction as foreign  
capital stock (a positive relationship) if the economy  
operates above policy-neutral point 6. Lx would be smaller  
than fix  if the economy operates below point 6 (Zo < 6) .  That  
is, the initial negative disequilibrium effect on the long- 
run agricultural land stock dominates the  foreign capital  
induced-income effect if the initial economy operates below  89 
the policy-neutral point 6 or the initial foreign capital  
Zo is smaller than e. In other words, the long-run  
equilibrium in agricultural land stock depends only on the  
disequilibrium effect if Zo is less than 6 whereas it  
depends on the sign of the term g if Zo is greater than 6  
since the coefficient TA is positive in a developing  
economy.  
As a result, the new long-run agricultural land stock  
depends on the relative size of the disequilibrium (the  
second term in (69)) and the policy (the first term in (69))  
effects. If Zo is greater than 6 (strong income effect),  
the unanticipated permanent policy increases the demand for  
the agricultural land, which leads to a reduction in the  
production of the environmental good. This result is exactly  
the same as in the previous section. This is presented  
graphically in Figure 3.2.  I will now consider the case of  
Z0 > 6 where the policy effect dominates the disequilibrium  
effect.  
3.7.2 Planned Permanent Capital Market Liberalization 
The government announces at t1 that the capital  
investment tax rate i will be effective at t2 and it is  
believed that this rate will be permanent. The change in the  
capital investment tax rate will, however, be correctly  
anticipated beginning at t1. The path of foreign capital is  
given by (70),  (71) and (72):  90 
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< t < ti, Z(t) =Z +(zo  )eit  (70) 
t1 < t < t2, Z (t) = Z +(zo  )east 
i) fttieul(t- 3) ft: el2(3-u) duds  (71) 
t2 < t,  Z(t) = Z +(zo(21 )e'lt  i)fti2 ea1(t-3),Cea2(3-u)duds 
+ (Bi  2 )(t  i)ftt, eal (t-3)ds  (72) 
The dynamic path of Z(t) in the period before the tax change 
takes effect but after it is announced, may be lower or 
higher than the base path  (70)  since the expectation effect 
on the current foreign capital stock is negative and the 
disequilibrium effect on the foreign capital stock is 
positive over the time period between t1 and t2. This 
generates a reversal in time period t* which is between t1 
and t2 where the disequillibrium and the expectation effects 
are offset exactly. Thus, the movement of foreign  capital 
stock at time period r is reversed. The disequilibrium 
effect dominates the expectation effect before the time 
period r, leading to a higher path than the base path for 
the foreign capital stock. After the time period r, the 
foreign capital path has a negative slope since the  
expectation effect dominates the disequilibrium effect.  
The path of foreign capital after t2 is positive  
because the initial foreign capital shortage  
(disequilibrium), the current policy effect and the  
expectation effect(in the previous period) move in the same  
direction over time.14 In addition the path of foreign  
"This result is obtained by differentiating equation (72) with respect to time t. 92 
capital at some time period after t2 is higher than the base  
path to take advantage of the lower tax rate after t2. This  
result implies that the foreign capital investor reduces  
capital investment in the period before the tax rate change  
in order to take advantage of a lower tax in the next  
period. After the tax rate change, the foreign capital  
inflow is increased due to the lower investment tax rate.  
This provides the expected result because the rational  
capital owner reduces his investment until the investment  
tax rate is lowered and then increases it after the lower  
tax rate is imposed. The amount of the foreign capital at t2  
might be less or greater than that at ti depending on the  
size of the expectation period (between t1 and t2) .  
The steady-state foreign capital equilibrium after the  
anticipated permanent capital market liberalization remains  
the same as the unanticipated permanent capital market  
liberalization. This result can be obtained by allowing t to  
go to infinity in equation (72). However,  the adjustment  
path to the steady-state equilibrium differs in that the  
anticipated policy has the expectation effect whereas the  
unanticipated policy does not.  
The pre-ti path of foreign capital moves along the  
base path. When time t expands beyond ti,  the foreign capital  
adjusts along a different path in (71) until t2. The path of  
(71) has both positive and negative slope between the time  
period t1 and t2. The capital owner reduces capital  
investment until the future period t2 to take advantage of  93 
the future lower capital tax rate. After t2,  the foreign  
capital owner takes full advantage of the lower capital tax  
rate and increases his investment. This is described  
graphically in Figure 3.2.  
The long-run steady-state equilibrium of foreign 
capital stock 2  is 2  +(Bi,f2)(ii)/(ai) which is greater 
than the initial steady-state equilibrium 2.  Thus, in the 
long-run, the anticipated permanent capital market 
liberalization increases the agricultural land demand, which 
leads to deforestation because of the assumption that there 
is a negative relationship between foreign capital and 
forest land in developing countries. As a result, the 
anticipated permant capital market liberalization policy 
reduces the production of the environmental good in the 
long-run. 
3.7.3 Planned Temporary Capital Market Liberalization 
Now,  I will discuss the anticipated temporary policy  
(tax break system) effect. The government announces at t1  
that the capital investment tax break (zero investment tax  
rate) will be effective at t2 and the initial investment tax  
rate will be restored at t3.  
From equation (60), the adjustment path of Z(t) is described  
as follows:  
0 < t <  Z(t)  + (Zo  )eatt  (73) 
ti  < t < t2, Z(t) = Z + (Zo  Z  )ealt  )h e2(8-')duds  (74) 
Eiftt,2ecii(t_s)  t: 
t2 < t < t3, Z(t) = Z + (Zo  Z )eait  e2(3-u)cluds 94 
f  (t- ds  (75) 
t3 < t,  Z(t) = Z + (Zo  Z )e'lt  f  e'l(t  f t: e°2(3-u) duds 
Bliftt:eai(t-8)ds  (76)  
The base path (73), which is the path of foreign capital  
stock before t1, moves towards the steady-state equilibrium  
point Z as time goes from 0 to ti since the initial foreign  
capital market is in disequilibrium (shortage) by  
assumption. Z(t) begins to move towards a new path at t1 when  
the investment tax rate change is first anticipated.  
The path of foreign capital in the pre-t2 period  
before the capital tax-break policy takes effect (74) is  
lower or higher than that in base period depending on the  
relative size of the disequilibrium and the expectation  
effects. This generates a reversal in time period t* which  
is between t1 and t2 where the disequilibrium and the  
expectation effects are offset exactly. Thus, the movement  
of the foreign capital stock is reversed at t*. This  
indicates that the disequilibrium (expectation) effect  
dominates if the economy operates before (after) t*. This  
implies that the investor increases the investment but at a  
lower rate until t* and then reduces investment to take  
advantage of tax-breaks in the future period.  
The path of foreign capital in the time period after a  
tax-break but before the original tax rate is restored (75),  
is positively sloped. This suggests that the foreign capital  
owner invests more foreign capital in the host country to  
take advantage of the tax-break.  95 
The path of foreign capital stock in the time period  
after the initial tax rate is restored (76), is negatively  
or positively sloped depending on the duration of the tax- 
break policy period. The tax-break policy and the  
expectation effect in the previous time period is carried  
over to the next time period after t3 since the asset  
variables Z and Lx change gradually. But, in the previous  
period the tax-break policy dies off slowly in the next time  
period. Thus the path of the foreign capital stock in (76)  
depends on the initial disequilibrium and the previous time  
period tax-break policy and past expectation effects. This  
result is due to the fact that rational agent incorporates  
all available past, current and future information in the  
current time period to make economic decisions.  
The amount of foreign capital stock at t3 might be  
less or greater than that on the base path at t3 depending  
on the size of the tax-break time period. The shorter the  
duration of the tax-break period, the more the foreign  
capital inflow is reduced.  
Hence, the foreign capital owner takes full advantage  
of the tax-break period in making his investment. Once the  
initial tax rate is restored, the foreign capital moves  
along the positive higher adjustment path (by the first and  
the second terms effect in (76)) and then along the negative  
adjustment path (by the third term effect in (76)) than that  
in the pre-t3 period   .  96 
the foreign capital stock  However, in the long-run, 
returns to the initial steady-state equilibrium position 2. 
Therefore, the temporary planned tax-break policy does not  
affect the steady-state foreign capital equilibrium, and  
thus there is no environmental effect in the long-run. As  
long as the final policy level returns to the initial policy  
level, the initial steady-state equilibrium is valid  
The entire adjustment path of foreign capital and  
environmental land toward steady-state equilibrium in all  
time periods is shown in Figure 3.3.  
3.7.4 Planned Gradual Market Liberalization  Policy 
I pay special attention to the planned gradual 
liberalization policy because it is a popular policy in the  
developing countries and an important future policy in the  
economic decision making process. Here, future policy refers  
to policies used by trading blocks such as APEC  (Asia  
Pacific Economic Committe) and EU (European Union) that  
require each member to submit a plan for future market  
liberalization. One such liberalization plan is the planned  
gradual market liberalization policy which is currently  
popular in most developing countries. This policy will be  
evaluated in the following paragraph.  97 
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The government announces at t1 that the foreign  
capital investment tax rate i will be effective at t2 and  
that i will fall to zero at t3.  In this case, the path of  
foreign capital stock can be written as follows:  
0 < t<  Z(t)  + (zo  )e-it  (77) 
i)ftti ecx,(t_s) rt:
t1 < t < t2, Z(t) = Z + (Zo  Z )et  h  e2G-4 duds 
+ Eiftti eal(t-s) ft7 ea2(3-1") duds  (78) 
z  ec,i(t-s) h
rt23 
t2  < t < t3, Z(t) = Z + (Zo  Z )east  e),2(.9-1,) duds 
Eiftt,2 el (t--)f,73. e2('-u) duds + a- iurt2e(t-s)  
ea2(3-1`) duds  +  f t: el(t---s)ft7 (79) 
E(7_,oftt2eal(t-s) 1;24
t3  < t,  Z(t) = Z + (Zo  Z )et  j  ex2(.9-u) duds 
tt2 eai(t--.9)ft7e2(s-u)   duds + B1a_i>ftt23eai(t-s)ds 
+ Eiftt: el (t- 17e2('-u) duds  
(Bi  ftt3el (t- 3) ds  (80)  
The dynamic path of Z(t) in the time period before the first  
stage of the liberalization policy takes effect (78), is  
lower or higher than the base path (77) since the initial  
capital shortage effect is positive and the current  
expectation effect of the capital liberalization in the  
future is negative. This results in the establishment of a  
reversal in time period t* which is between 4 and t2 for the  
same reason as in the previous section.  
The path of Z(t), during the first stage of  
liberalization (79), is negatively or positively sloped  
depending on the relative size of the last two terms (the  
expectation effect of a future zero tax rate and the first  
stage liberalization effect) in equation (79). Thus, a  99 
reversal time period r* between t2 and t3 occurs. The net  
path of (79)  is ambiguous when compared with the path of  
(78). The path of (79)  is positive if the first stage  
liberalization effect dominates the expectation effect of a  
future zero tax rate  (i.e., t < t") .  The path of (79)  is  
negative after t ** because the expectation effect of a future  
zero tax rate is greater than the first stage liberalization  
effect.  
The path of foreign capital after the last stage of  
liberalization starts, is higher than the pre -t3 to take  
advantage of the zero tax rate. This implies that in the  
final liberalization stage, the capital investment path  
operates at the higher path to take full advantage of free  
trade (zero tax).  
The amount of foreign capital inflow at time period t2  
and t3 depends on the duration of the expectation period  
from t1 to t2 and on the first stage liberalization period  
from t2 to t3. The longer the expectation period between t1  
and t2,  the lower the amount of foreign capital inflow at t2.  
In the same way, the longer the duration of the first stage  
liberalization period, the lower the foreign capital inflow  
at t3.  
In the long-run, the new steady-state equilibrium of  
foreign capital in the gradual market liberalization policy  
is also higher than the initial steady-state equilibrium.  
This result can be obtained by allowing time t to go to oo  
in equation (80). Therefore, the gradual capital market  100 
liberalization policy stimulates more foreign capital inflow  
into the domestic market. In the developing economy, the  
increase of foreign capital stock in the long-run increases  
the development of agricultural land (see (69)), leading to  
an increase in deforestation. As a result, less  
environmental goods are produced by nature. The entire  
adjustment path of foreign capital and environmental land  
towards a steady-state equilibrium in all time periods is  
shown in Figure 3.4.  101 
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In a dynamic FDI general equilibrium model of a small  
open economy where land is the only asset of the host  
country and foreign capital is the only asset of the foreign  
country, domestic environmental development through land  
development is closely linked to movements in the foreign  
capital inflow. This Chapter has examined the environmental  
effect of capital policies such as the unanticipated  
permanent, anticipated permanent, planned temporary and  
planned gradual liberalization policies. The analysis shows  
that in the long-run, all capital liberalization policies,  
except for the tax-break (the planned temporary) policy in a  
developing economy, affect the foreign capital inflow and  
increase the deforestation of forest land through  
agricultural land development. The tax-break policy (in the  
long-run) does not affect the environmental sector since  
there is no change in foreign capital inflow.  
In the analysis of the dynamic adjustment period, the  
environmental development due to the capital liberalization  
policies takes a different path to the long-run (steady-
state) equilibrium depending on the type of policy that is  
chosen. Generally, the rational economic agent lowers  
current capital investment to take advantage of the future  
lower tax rate. This leads to a reduction in the production  
of the environmental good. However, it is possible that  
capital liberalization polcies might not lower the path of  
the foreign capital stock if the country's initial capital  
shortage is strong enough to dominate the policy effect.  103 
This case is appropriate for most developing countries  
because they tend to have high initial capital shortages.  
Consequently, the capital liberalization policy in a  
developing country is likely to be less effective than in a  
developed country since the initial capital shortage in a  
developed country is likely to be small.  
The national welfare effect due to anticipated or  
unanticipated permanent liberalization policies (except the  
tax-break policy) improves welfare in the developed country  
because the consumption of both importable and exportable  
goods increases whereas it lowers welfare in the developing  
country because it lowers consumption of both goods. This  
result would be reversed if the consumer placed a strong  
value on the environmental effect because capital  
liberalization (except tax-break) policies reduce  
(increases) the production of the environmental good in the  
developing (developed) country. This result is consistent  
with the outcome of the static model in Chapter 1. In the  
static model with unemployment, the reduction of production  
of the environmental good by lowering the tax rate in a  
developed country improves the national welfare since the  
consumer in a developed country places high value on the  
environmental good. Therefore, The static and dynamic models  
provide the policy implication that environmental impacts of  
market liberalization policies are important to national  
welfare.  104 
The next chapter incorporates the environmental effect  
into the consumer's utility function in a dynamic model.  
This model is more consistent with the static model in the  
first Chapter where the consumer values the environmental  
effect.  105 
CHAPTER 4.  
DYNAMIC ANALYSIS OF THE TAX POLICY EFFECTS  
TO THE ENVIRONMENT IN THE PRESENCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL  
GOODS IN THE CONSUMER'S UTILITY FUNCTION  
This chapter extends the basic model from Chapter 2 by  
including the environmental good in the consumer's utility  
function. The formal solution process is omitted since the  
exact method used in the second chapter is also utilized  
here.  
I now introduce the environmental good in the  
consumer's utility. This is more consistent with the first  
chapter of this dissertation. The basic model setup for the  
consumer is to maximize his utility  
W =masfoc°{U(Cx, Cy) + Q}e-13idt  
subject to  
the flow budget constraint  
PCx +Cy + PL. = PX(nr, Lx)  Tiny 
labor employment condition 
ns+ny(1 + = 
and initial condition 
L,(0)=Lo 
I use a quasilininear utility function because of its 
convenience. Note that the utility function is linear in 
environmental good Q and that the production side is 
identical with that in the previous Chapter. By using the 106 
same solution method as in the previous Chapter,  I can 
derive the following dynamic optimality conditions:  (1)  the 
shadow value of land,  (2) land development,  (3)  foreign 
capital investment, and (4) the shadow value of foreign 
capital 
A = A0-6(Lx,z))+1  (81) 
PL,  = PX(n.(Z ,  L.) +Tvny(Z, Lx) + igq; i) 
PC x(A)  Cy (A)  (82) 
I (q;i)  (83) 
4 =  -Yz(ny(Z),Z)  (84) 
In (81) A represents the marginal damage of land instead of 
the marginal utility of land as in the previous chapter. 
Consequently, a one unit increase in agricultural land 
lowers utility by A  units. 
Equations (81) and (82) correspond to the equations  
(34d) and (34f) if the environmental good is not included in  
the consumer's utility function. The optimality conditions,  
with the exception of equation (34d) and (34f), in the  
previous Chapter are still valid in this model.  
Since the main focus of this thesis is to derive the  
relationship between foreign capital stock and domestic land  
in the environmental sector as the policy changes,  
I develop the relationship between these two variables by  
using equations (81)-(84). From equation (81)-(84), the  
general solution for the short-run and long-run marginal  
damage of rural land can be described in the following form:  
A = rAj + M(Zo  )ea't  (85) 107 
= Ao  m(zo  )  (86) 
{(861aLr)+(a6oz)}  where N2=  By following the previous  .  
assumption of 0=5  in the stable economy, the term 
A{(aaiaLiwa6laz)}  is negative since the numerator is  
negative (see (40d)) and the denominator is positive. The  
equation (85) implies that an increase in the foreign  
capital stock lowers the price of  agricultural land. This  
is due to the fact that the marginal productivity of  
agriculture land declines as one more unit of land is added.  
The reduction of the marginal productivity of agriculture  
land reduces the input price of the agricultural land  
because the labor market is assumed to be perfectly  
competetive.  
Additionally, the solution to the agricultural land  
development for the short-run and the long-run path is:  
PLx = PrZx+  (e-o +  7T1+411)(Zo- )e-it  (87) 
PL x = PL0  + -,24-M)(Zo  )  (88) 
where fly  =  P!Rc +  <O. Equations (87) and (88) differ from 
equations (49) and (50) in that the former has a marginal 
damage effect of rural land  on the land development, (;,/,,14)  
in addition to the foreign capital stock effect  (e-#). This  
result comes mainly from the assumption that the utility  
form is a function of consumption and environmental goods.  
In equations (87) and (88), we observe that land development  
depends not only on the foreign capital stock change but  
also on the marginal damage of land (the environmental  
effect). The foreign capital effect (-g-) is positive in a  108 
developing country because the term Q is negative by  
assumption whereas the environmental effect (N1) is  
negative because the terms , al and NI are negative.  
Differentiating (87) with respect to time t,  I obtain:  
(89)  PLz '(c75±;7TM)2  
or Q=  +/-1402  (90)  
The equation (90) establishes the relationship between the  
foreign capital inflow and the environment development. From  
(89) it is not clear that increasing the capital stock leads  
to increasing or decreasing land development if the  
environmental effect is included in the utility function in  
the developing or less developed stage  (i.e  fl < 0) as it  
converges to the long-run equilibrium level. Land  
development will only decline if the environment effect  
dominates the foreign capital effect. Land development will  
rise in the adjustment period if the foreign capital effect  
dominates the environmental effect. Therefore, the extent of  
land development depends on the relative size of the  
environmental and foreign capital effects induced by the  
capital liberalization policy. The inclusion of  
environmental good in the utility function slows down the  
land development in a developing country even if the  
environmental effect is small.  
The general agriculture land development in (89) moves  
in the same direction as the foreign capital path and in the  
opposite direction of the environmental path when the  109 
economy in a developing country is on a stable path.  
Therefore, the presence of the environmental effect in (87)  
magnifies or reduces land development depending on the  
relative size of the environmental and the foreign capital  
effects. This implies that the level of net land development  
is ambiguous as time t changes through the adjustment path  
if the relative size of the two effects is unknown. The land  
development effect when the consumer values the  
environmental good, is summarized in the following  
proposition.  
Proposition 7. In a developing or less  developed economy during the adjustment 
period, the inclusion o f the environmental good in utility f unction reduces the 
effect o f foreign capital on land development as t increases and when the initial 
capital market starts at a shortage. I f the environmental effect is strong enough to 
outweigh the foreign capital effect, the land development declines over time, 
leading to reforestation (a higher production o f environmental good production) . 
.  Proof 
In equations (45), the foreign capital stock increases with  
respect to time only if the initial capital market operates  
at a shortage. Then, the foreign capital impact on land  
development in (89) will be partially offset by the marginal  
damage impact (the environmental effect) of land  
development. This holds because as time t changes in a  
developing or less-developed economy I assumed that the  
environmental effect will be smaller than the foreign  
capital effect. However, if the environmental effect  110 
outweighs the foreign capital effect, land development will  
decline, leading to reforestation. This occurs because the  
strong environmental awareness reverses the path of land  
development. The adjustment path of foreign capital and  
environmental land toward the steady-state equilibrium in  
all time periods is shown in Figure 4.  
In regard to the long-run capital market  
liberalization policy, the long-run effect on land  
development does not remain the same as the previous  
chapter's result since the marginal damage of rural land A  
in (88)  is included in the intertemporal budget constraints.  
To see how the steady-state equilibrium agricultural land  
stock changes in response to capital liberalization policy,  
I totally differentiate equation (88) with respect to  
capital investment tax is  
d ridx /di =  -2a1 a, -B (ZO  ) + (  + al  di  (91) 
The sign of equation (91)  is ambiguous depending on the  
relative size of the capital shortage and the policy  
effects. The first set of brackets in (91) is the initial  
capital shortage effect whereas the second set of brackets  
in (91) is the policy effect. The sign of the initial  
capital shortage effect is positive since the term (ZA-2)  
is positive and the term Hal) is positive. In a developing  
country, the foreign capital effect  (e70.)  is positive  
because Q is negative whereas the environmental effect  111 
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(-114/1)  is negative. Hence, the coefficient of the policy  
effect  z4=-110/1 may be positive or negative if the foreign  
capital (the environmental) effect dominates the  
environmental (foreign capital) effect. However, the sign of  
the coefficient of the policy effect in a developing country  
is positive because the foreign capital effect is more  
likely to dominate the environmental effect since the  
consumer in a developing country has less environmental  
awareness than in a developed country. The result is that  
the policy effect in a developing country is negative  
because the coefficient term  134-;:i1N4 is positive and the  
term q is negative. The term el is negative because  
capital liberalization induces more foreign capital inflow  
in the host country. Thus, the policy effect in a developing  
country is negative whereas the initial capital shortage- 
effect is positive. These two opposing forces affect land  
development in opposite directions. As a result, the long- 
run agricultural land (the environmental) effect is  
ambiguous depending the relative size of the capital  
shortage and policy effect. This generates policy-neutral  
point 6 where the initial capital shortage effect is offest  
exactly by the foreign capital effect. Then 6 can be  
obtained by setting drijddi==0 in (91) and written as  
follows:  
ZO  al:y  dc:  Z =C6  (92) 
01-9 113 
The equation (92) corresponds to the equation (57) where no  
environmental good is included in the utility function. As I  
already explained in (57), the policy-neutral point implies  
that the agriculture land demand is not affected by the  
lower capital tax rate if the initial foreign capital Zo is  
equal to 6. The agricultural land stock increases because  
of the lower tax rate if the initial foreign capital stock  
2'0 is greater than 6 (a strong policy effect) wherease the  
outcome would be reversed if the initial foreign capital  
stock Zo is less than 6 (strong capital shortage effect).  
Therefore, the agricultural land effect of the lower capital  
tax rate depends on how much of the initial foreign capital  
stock is held in capital importing country.  
If the country with Z0 > 6 has a less strong  
environmental effect, the lower investment tax rate will  
promote land development leading to the deforestation of  
forest land. Since most developing countries do not have a  
strong environmental awareness, the lower investment tax in  
the developing countries will most likely stimulate land  
development which will result in less of the environmental  
good. However, the developed economy will likely reduce  
land development by lowering the investment tax rate since  
the developed country has a strong environmental effect,  
leading to the increase of environment good consumption.  
In conclusion, the presence of the environmental good  
in the quasi-linear utility function will slow down the  
deterioration of the environment if the policy effect  114 
dominates the capital shortage effect and the environmental  
effect is smaller than the foreign capital inflow induced by  
the lower capital tax. However, the inclusion of the  
environment in the consumer's utility function for  
developing economies might reverse the result of the  
previous model. This will be true when capital  
liberalization decreases the size of forest land due to the  
environmental effect being sufficiently large to outweigh  
the lower tax-induced foreign capital inflow effect. In the  
developed country, the capital market liberalization policy  
stimulates reforestation and thus increase the consumption  
of the environmental good.  
Therefore, the lower capital tax results in deteriortation  
of the environment in a developing country and the  
improvement of the environment in a developed country.  115 
CHAPTER 5.  
GENERAL CONCLUSION  
This paper has analyzed a three sector-model of growth  
where the forest sector produces environmental goods with a  
nature-dependent identity technology. The developing country  
is in a situation where the initial economy has a  shortage  
of potential long-run assets in equilibrium. These assets  
are foreign capital and agricultural land stock.  
The results from the static analysis in the second  
chapter indicate that one of the domestic capital market  
liberalization policies, lower capital investment tax rate  
in the credit-cum-limitation tax system, encourages the  
deforestation of land and thus reduces production of the  
environmental good in an economy unless the agricultural  
product and the environmental goods are substitutes in  
consumption. In the context of national welfare, the capital  
market liberalization policy increases the consumption of  
the agricultural good and the manufactured good, thus  
leading to the improvement of welfare level if the consumer  
ignores the environmental effect. In a developing country,  
welfare is improved by higher consumption since the  
environmental effect is likely to be small in a developing  
country. However, in a developed country welfare is  
decreased by the lower consumption of the environmental good  116 
since the environmental effect is likely to be high in a  
developed country.  
The results of the dynamic analysis in the absence of  
the environmental good in the utility function in the third  
chapter suggests that in the long-run the capital  
liberalization policy may improve the net welfare of the  
domestic country. In Chapter 4 it is then shown that if the  
environmental good is included in the utility function this  
welfare outcome could be reversed. That is, if the consumer  
values the environmental good there could be a decrease in  
welfare due to capital liberalization. In the dynamic policy  
analysis (under the rational expectation model), the initial  
long-run steady-state equilibrium will be restored when the  
planned temporary capital market liberalization policy is  
used. However, in the short-run, the adjustment of the  
foreign capital stock toward the long-run steady-state  
equilibrium moves along different paths over the time- 
varying policy change.  
The final result of the dynamic analysis in the  
presence of the environmental good in the utility function  
shows that in the short-run (the adjustment period), the  
marginal damage to the environment slows down land  
conversion from forestry to agricultural land if the initial  
capital shortage effect is smaller than the capital  
liberalization policy effect (Z0 < G) .  The slower land  
development reduces the speed of the land deforestation  
process. However, the land stock for agricultural use may be  117 
reduced if the environmental effect dominates the foreign  
capital inflow effect in the policy imposing country. This  
outcome suggests that the environment plays an important  
role in the development of land for agricultural use.  
This analysis shows that a lower tax rate in a  
developing economy can have an effect on the environment. In  
the static analysis, where a general form utility function  
is used and the price of the nontradeable good fluctuates, a  
reduction in the capital tax rate induces deforestation and  
consequently less production of the environmental good.  
In the long-run dynamic analysis, where the utility  
function is quasi-linear and the price of exportable and  
importable goods are fixed, a dynamic capital liberalization  
policy has the following implications:  (1) when there are  
the unanticipated permanent, anticipated permanent and  
planned gradual capital market liberalization policies, the  
long-run production of the environmental good is reduced and  
(2) when there is a tax-break (planned temporary capital  
market liberalization) policy, the long-run production of  
the environmental good remains unchanged. In the adjustment  
period, the environmental effect under different dynamic  
policies provides different policy implications:  (1) when  
there is an unanticipated permanent capital market  
liberalization policy, then the production of the  
environmental good reduced until a new steady-state  
equilibrium is reached.  (2) when there is an anticipated  
capital market liberalization policy, the production of the  118 
environmental good is increased during the expectation  
period (t* < t< t2 in Figure 3.2) and then decreased after the  
lower tax rate takes effect.  (3) when there is a tax-break  
policy (planned temporary capital market liberalization),  
the production of the environmental good is increased during  
the expectation period (e<t<t2 in Figure 3.3) and then  
decreased when the lower tax rate takes effect. But, the  
production of the environmental good starts to increase  
toward the initial steady-state equilibrium when the initial  
capital tax rate is restored.  (4) when there is a planned  
gradual capital market liberalization policy, the  
environmental good is increased during the expectation  
period (t* <t<t2 in Figure 3.4) and then decreased during  
the time period where the expectation effect of future zero  
tax rate in the first stage liberalization is strong  
(t2<t<t"  in Figure 3.4) .  However, the environmental good 
is increased during the time period where the first stage  
liberalization effect is strong (t** <t<t3 in Figure 3.4)  
and then decreased during the second stage liberalization  
period (zero tax rate period).  
The deforestation process is slowed down if the  
consumer values the environment. As a result,  the production  
of the environmental good grows faster. This result suggests  
that decision-makers should take environmental effects into  
account when imposing capital liberalization policies  
because different capital liberalization policies produce  119 
different outcomes depending on strength of the  
environmental effect.  
The following are suggestions for future research.  
First, new insights could be gleaned by including learning-
by-doing effects. These effects might help to explain the  
growing environmental concern of economic agents as the  
economy becomes more liberalized.  Second, a direct  
environmental tax policy could be investigated and compared  
to the capital investment tax policy. Third, it would be  
interesting to conduct an empirical analysis to test the  
results of this analysis.  120 
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APPENDIX  
1. The consumer's maximization problem given in (32) can be  
set up as the maximization of the following present-value  
Hamilitonian:  
H =  e-i3t[U(Cx, Cy) + A [PX(nx,  +Wny PCx  Cy +7] 
+ 0[N  nz  ny(1+ 141 
where A is the shadow value of land asset,  is the  
Lagrangian multiplier of labor constraint. The optimality  
conditions of (34a)-(34b),  (34d),  (34f), and (34i)-(37)  
results from setting  
aH/aCx =aH/aCy.a.H/aLs.a.wanr.aH/any.aH/al,b.o and  
using 0/A= w. The rest of optimality conditions can be  
obtained by setting up Hamiltonian from the foreign sector's  
profit maximization.  
2. To derive equations (40b)-(40f), we reduce equations  
(34i)-(37) to five equations:  
PX1,(nz,Lx)...5  
Yr1/4,(ny,Z)=1-17  
(1 +  A)PXnz(nr, Lx)  =17) 
nz + ny(1+ th) =N 
Yz(ny, Z) = r  
Totally differentiate the above five equations to get:  
PXLzn.  0  1  0  0  dnz-
Ynn,  0  0  0  dny 
P(1 + ti)Xnxn,  0  0  PX,,z  0  db 
1 
0 
(1+  /2) 
YZn, 
0 
0 
ny 
0 
0 1  dr 125 
PX11  0 
0  Yn, Z 
=  PX,.Lx (1 + p)  dLx+  0  dZ 
0  0 
0  Yzz 
The determinant of the coefficent matrix is given by  
ID1  =  PXnnzYnyn (1 + p)ny  PY,,,,,,Xn, >  0. 
We solve for the effects of endogeneous variables with 
respect to two exogenous variables Lx  and Z. 
dnsIdLx =  Th{Yno,PXnzLx(1+ p)ny} > 0 
dnrIdZ =  ffi{Y,,zPXnz (1 +  II)} < 0 
dnyldLx = 0 
dnyldZ =  y1 n,{17,,,z} > 0 
d6 IdLx =  *Y,,,,,,,,{P2X,L(1+  th)ny + P2 XLLrXn:  P2ny(1+ P)XninzXL.L.} 
<0  
c15/dZ =  *{YnvzP2XLzr4Xnz(1+ p)} < 0 
dpIdLx =  *Y7,n,,{PXnztz(1+  th)} < 0 
dµ /dZ = *{Ynt,zYno,,PXn:n,  (1 + Ail > 0 
dr I dLx  = 0  
dr /dZ = ynvini,{Yno,YZZ  Yn2vz} <  0.  